

THE CHURCHMAN

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THE CHURCHMAN

Editor :

THE REV. PHILIP E. HUGHES, M.A., B.D., D.Litt.

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Editorial

ALL Saints' Day appropriately saw the publication of an Open Letter to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York on the subject of Intercommunion, signed by 32 theologians of the Church of England. Included among the signatories were the Ely, Lady Margaret's, and Norris-Hulse Professors of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, the Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford, former Regius Professors of Divinity in the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford, the Van Mildert Professor of Divinity in the University of Durham, the Principals of six theological colleges, the General Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, and sundry university dons. Whether the letter was timed with an eye on the assembly of the World Council of Churches in New Delhi we cannot say; but, if it was opportune for this reason (and the news of its contents must have been welcome to the majority of those meeting in New Delhi), it was even more opportune because of the urgent need for some impressive move to arrest the impulse which has been threatening to accelerate the Church of England into a situation of exclusiveness compatible neither with the New Testament nor with its own traditions.

While affirming their belief that the acceptance of the historic episcopate is "the best means whereby a reunited church may be given a fitting form in which its inward unity in Christ may be manifested", the signatories recognize "that it is our Lord who calls and commissions His ministers, and that He is not tied to any one form of ministry"—so much so, that He conveys through non-episcopal ministries "the same grace of the Word and Sacraments as He bestows through the historic ministry of bishops", and He does this, "not as an act of uncovenanted mercy, but because they are real and efficacious ministries within the Body of His Church".

This declaration expresses clearly and unambiguously a position which, if we have regard to the lessons of our Church's past, must be described as genuinely Anglican, and to which this journal has borne consistent testimony. It is a fact of history that full reciprocal intercommunion between the Church of England and other Reformed, albeit non-episcopal, churches existed traditionally and without inhibition in former years. It would be interesting to know when and by what official decree this state of full communion between the Church of England and fellow Reformed churches was terminated. Happily, this charitable custom of reciprocal hospitality is still alive in our Church today, and there are signs, of which this Open Letter is the latest, that churchpeople are becoming increasingly aware once again of its rightness. Yet at the present time the Church of England, in its official presentation of itself, would seem to be standing on its

head, since we are now assured that we are in communion with churches which may be precisely designated as unreformed, such as the Old Catholic and the Orthodox Churches, and not with our former intimates, the Church of Scotland and the Reformed churches of the Continent. But by what authority are these decisions made? And are they indicative of the true situation? Is it not a case of our church being led by the nose by an officialdom which, however excellent in other respects, shows insufficient respect for the history of the Church of England and the theology of our Prayer Book and Articles? And can it be doubted that those who are now calling for a return to the old paths are expressing the desire of the majority in our church?

With regard to schemes of union or reunion, the signatories stress that "where separated churches come together in a rite of unification, their ministers receive an extension of their existing authority which had previously been limited to the particular church in which each has been ordained". We are convinced that a definite declaration of what is (and, if necessary, what is not) involved is essential if rites of unification are to mean anything real in the coming together of separated churches. This was shown plainly enough in the Convocation debates earlier this year as to whether or not the proposed Church of Lanka in Ceylon should be accorded the status of being in full communion with the Church of England. In the Lanka scheme the precise significance of the rite of unification was designedly, it would appear, left undefined, so that anybody could put whatever interpretation upon it he wished. Accordingly, one of our bishops is reported to have observed that the rite would be at one and the same time an ordination if and where that was needed, and, where it was not, a public act of "identification". In other words, those who regard episcopacy as absolutely essential to the being of the Church would treat it as an ordination, a conferring of valid orders, on ministers from non-episcopal churches, but for themselves, who acknowledge no such lack, as no more than an identifying gesture. The outlook for the ecumenical movement is a sorry one if it is imagined that ambiguity can be exalted to become one of the cardinal virtues, or that difficulties, and especially cruces of division such as the question of the validity of orders, can be left behind by refusing to face them openly and by covering them with double-talk. A yawning crevasse covered over with gleaming snow is not less but more dangerous. Differences, therefore, should be discussed frankly, charitably, and scripturally, and mended, not by vague wool-pulling, but with the strong cord of theological definition.

The 32 theologians of the Open Letter express their dissent, further, from the statement contained in the Report of the 1958 Lambeth Conference that "Anglicans conscientiously hold that the celebrant of the Eucharist should have been ordained by a bishop standing in the historic succession, and generally believe it to be their duty to bear witness to this principle by receiving Holy Communion only from those who have thus been ordained". "We do not acknowledge such a duty," they say, "and we know that our conviction is shared by many other Anglicans. Moreover, we hold that our view is in full accord with the teaching of our church and its tradition as both Catholic

and Reformed." This is not, of course, the first time that this notorious statement of the Lambeth Report has been strongly criticized; but it is gratifying that it should now have been denounced by so distinguished a group of theologians.

The Open Letter has stimulated a prolonged correspondence in *The Times* as well as in the church newspapers, and it has also provoked a rejoinder in the form of a second open letter addressed to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York by 53 members of the House of Laity of the Church Assembly, who described themselves as "non-theologians" and, in opposition to the 32 theologians, declared their adherence to the rigorist view of episcopacy as essential for a valid ministry. One began to fear that our long-suffering Archbishops were going to be submerged under a cascade of open letters. But there has been no news of any further blasts and counter-blasts of this nature. *The Times* did, however, publish (on November 23) a significant letter from certain other members of the House of Laity "wholeheartedly and strongly" endorsing "the call put forward by the distinguished theologians for a more charitable policy on inter-communion", and asserting that they would conceive it their duty in the Church Assembly "to proclaim and to endeavour to make truly effective the historic principle that the Lord's table should be freely open to the Lord's people, remembering that it is His table, not ours, to share"—a conviction which, as our readers well know, is approved by this journal.

The doctrine of episcopacy, it is now plain, will be a determining factor in the whole future development of the ecumenical movement. If that doctrine conceives of episcopacy as constitutive of ministerial and sacramental validity and indispensable to the structure of the Church, then it presents an insuperable barrier to full union and fellowship with non-episcopal churches which cannot conscientiously appropriate such a doctrine with all its implications. But if that doctrine conceives of a bishop as exercising an essentially pastoral oversight over but not above his fellow-presbyters in their respective spheres of responsibility, as a guardian of the apostolic faith of the New Testament, and for these reasons as a centre of Christian unity, then it could be a means of knitting together again the limbs of the broken Body of Christ in our land. Meanwhile, as a matter of Christian principle, the Lord's Table must be kept open to the Lord's people. In short, we should now cease to think and speak in terms of separate and self-enclosed "communions" (Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist, and so on)—a concept which implicitly contradicts the oneness in Christ of all believers: would it not be truer and more realistic to call them "disunions"?—and determine to think, speak, and act in terms of the Apostle's doctrine of the communion of "all men everywhere who invoke the name of our Lord Jesus Christ—their Lord as well as ours" (1 Cor. i. 2, N.E.B.).

* * * *

During last month's session of the Church Assembly a motion proposing that the term "altar" (which is *not* found in the Book of Common Prayer, from which it was purposely excluded) should be

introduced as an alternative to the designation "communion table" in the title and text of draft Canon G2 was passed in the House of Laity despite the voicing of serious objections. Thereupon the House proceeded to pass another motion which proposed that the designation "holy table" should be substituted for "communion table" so that the wording should not be at variance with the terminology of the Book of Common Prayer! Inconsistency of this kind is the opposite of impressive and is not calculated to enhance the reputation of the House as a place of discernment and sound judgment.

To harmonize the terminology of the Canons with that of the Book of Common Prayer is a sound principle, for the compilers of our Prayer Book exercised meticulous care in their choice of language. This is not to deny, of course, that some of the words they used are now antiquated and need to be replaced by terms which communicate effectively the intended sense to the congregations of our day. But the word "table", it is hardly necessary to say, is not one of those words. And it should be appreciated that, however widespread may be the use of the term "altar" at the present time, those who oppose its inclusion in our formularies do so for reasons that are not frivolous. (To urge the acceptance of a theologically loaded term merely on the grounds that it is commonly used is frivolous.) Their objections are precisely those which caused our Reformers to exclude the designation "altar" from the Prayer Book—namely, that the sacrament of Holy Communion was instituted by our Lord around a table, not before an altar; and, further, that an altar, as specifically the place of the offering up of sacrifice, is as such inappropriate to the dominical doctrine of the sacrament as not the thing itself but something done in remembrance of that unique act of love which procured our eternal redemption. Few are likely to dispute the Biblical teaching that there is but one Christian altar, the actual cross of Calvary, but one sacrificing priest, the Lord Christ, and but one atoning sacrifice, that of Christ Himself offered once for all on the cross. The Holy Communion, in a word, is a sacrament and not a sacrifice. It is indeed a pointer to the one Sacrifice and a means to the faithful of embracing its benefits. But, as Augustine and Hooker and many others have observed, to identify a sign with the reality which it signifies is to overthrow the nature of a sacrament. This, however, is exactly the effect which the use of the term "altar" has when connected with the eucharist. It confuses the symbols of bread and wine with the reality to which they point. It does away with the table as the place of hospitality and fellowship around which fellow-Christians meet in communion with their Lord and with each other. It promotes a type of sacerdotalism which belongs to the superseded order of the Old Testament, not to that of the New.

The use of the term "altar" as a substitute or alternative for "table" is, therefore, an abuse which should be discouraged, both because it is incompatible with the sacramental doctrine and language of the Book of Common Prayer, and also because the two terms are not synonymous and therefore cannot sensibly be pressed as interchangeable.

P.E.H.

The Bible and the Authority of Reason

BY JAMES PACKER

THIS title is in itself highly provocative. We may expect it to draw forth strong reactions from two quite different types of people.

On the one hand, those who speak for the post-Christian humanism of the West will not like it. They will object to it for seeming to imply that the Bible takes precedence over the authority of reason. This implication, they will say, is false ; the authority of reason is absolute and sacrosanct, and is subject to nothing that is external to reason itself. And they will wish to change our title to "The Authority of Reason and the Bible", in order to make it express their view that reason ought to judge Scripture, but not vice versa.

On the other hand, the alert evangelical Christian will not like our title either. He will complain of it for seeming to imply that the authority of reason is a reality with which the Bible in some way comes to terms. But this, he will say, is not so : the authoritative Scriptures do not regard the authority of reason as any more of a reality than is the power of an idol, or the truth of a lie. And he will go on to tell us that the word "authority" in our title ought to stand in inverted commas, or be followed by a bracketed question-mark, so as to show that the real issue here is whether the Bible will allow us to speak of the "authority" of reason at all.

So here we have two diametrically opposed positions. The humanist asserts that all authority belongs to human reason ; and if there be a god, his status is merely that of patron for the truths which reason determines. The evangelical Christian asserts that all authority belongs to God the Creator, and not, therefore, to human reason ; for human reason is not God. The seat of authority is not in the minds of men, but in the Word of God, before which human reason must bow.

From this difference of principle flows a difference of intellectual method. The humanist subjects all things, the teaching of Scripture included, to his own critical judgment. The evangelical Christian subjects all things, including his own thoughts and those of other men, to the critical judgment of Holy Scripture. Hence, when the humanist and the evangelical Christian meet in discussion, head-on collisions are inevitable.

But someone will say : surely there is a way of avoiding them ? Can we not eliminate these collisions by partitioning the fields of life and truth into two watertight compartments ? Can we not mark off the realm of religion from the secular realm, and let the Bible hold sway in the first, while reason rules in the second ? Can we not in this way arrange a working agreement—a limited mutual recognition, a concordat—between the Bible and reason ? Can we not thus keep the two principles of authority from clashing, by ensuring that they are never both applied to the same subject-matter ?

No, we cannot. The solution is not feasible, for two reasons. In the first place : how are we to fix the line of demarcation between the two realms ? By appealing to the Bible, or to reason ? The very act of appealing to one rather than the other is in effect a recognition that the one to which we appeal has authority over the other. Thus we cannot fix any time of demarcation without prejudging the very issue which we were trying to evade. And then, in the second place, neither the Bible nor reason will allow us to partition life and truth in this way. The evangelical Christian cannot concede that there is any department of life or thought in which the Creator does not demand to rule through His written word. The Christian will therefore wish to tell the humanist that the Bible, or, rather, the God of the Bible, claims to exercise authority over all human thinking, and all human conduct, and that nothing may be exempted from His sway. And our humanist friends will, I think, be equally anxious to assure us that reason claims to rule the whole of life, and that all we believe and do needs to be brought into line with its dictates. Discussion will show that each side is committed to a programme which includes the conversion of the other. Our humanist friends will tell us that they want to bring us to their way of thinking, because ours is obscurantist and outmoded. We shall reply that we want, under God, to convert them to our way of thinking, because theirs is sin. In other words, the conflict here is between two rival views of life, two totalitarian ideologies, each of which necessarily condemns the other and seeks to overthrow it. And the idea that one could stop this conflict by partitioning life between the two combatants is foolish. One might as well hope to stop two boxers from trying to knock each other out by drawing a chalk line across the ring !

The directness of the opposition between these two outlooks has become clearer in recent years than once it was. A century ago, in Europe and America, post-Christian humanism in its various forms was in an advanced state of growth, but for the most part it had not yet cut loose from the Christian Church. By and large, its status was still that of a cuckoo in the Church's nest ; it was still vaguely theistic and represented its opinions as a reinterpretation of Christianity rather than as an alternative to it. Only a few bolder spokesmen of the humanistic movement, like Nietzsche, ventured as yet to challenge the Christian outlook as a whole ; and within the churches only a few prophetic spirits, like Abraham Kuyper, saw the magnitude of the ideological conflict which was brewing. Today, however, things are different. The humanists are now for the most part outside the Church, and attacking it ; and the trend of modern theology, with its renewed stress on divine revelation and man's bondage to sin, has been such as to make it clear that humanistic self-sufficiency and biblical Christianity will not mix. The conflict between Christianity and humanism in all its many shapes—idealist, materialist, and existentialist—is now generally realized to be a war to the death. It can only end with the collapse or capitulation of one or both of the contending parties.

What I have said has already shown that the Western humanist is in revolt against his Christian cultural heritage. Accordingly, his claim that final authority for life resides in human reason must be understood as a defiant denial of the historic Christian view on which the post-Reformation culture of Europe and America was founded—the view, namely, that final authority for man's life resides in the statements of Holy Scripture. Our humanist friend, whether he calls himself a theist or an atheist, will deny categorically that Holy Scripture is authoritative divine truth in writing. This denial is the foundation on which his whole position rests. It is worth our while to consider at this point how he would justify his view of Holy Scripture.

If faced with this question, our humanist friend will probably think it enough simply to say that the older view of Holy Scripture was overthrown a century ago by the literary, historical, and philosophical critique to which the Bible was then subjected. The Bible, he will say, emerged from this ordeal a discredited oracle, a fallen idol. The view that all biblical assertions were authoritative divine utterances presupposed that all biblical assertions were true. But the effect of criticism was to show that not all biblical assertions are true. The critics taught the Western world to see the Bible as a strange mixture of fact with fancy, and of truth with error. Thus they made it impossible for modern man to go on treating the Bible as God's infallible truth. And thus they made it impossible for modern man to regard biblical statements, as such, as possessing final authority; for final authority cannot attach to statements which are not certainly true. So our humanist friend will tell us that the old Protestant claim, that final authority for faith and life resides in the teaching of Holy Scripture, has now been exploded, just as the similar claim on behalf of the "teaching church" was exploded at the time of the Reformation. But this, he will say, compels modern man to make his own reason his final authority for determining belief and behaviour, since no valid external principle of authority now presents itself. As claimants to final authority, both the Church and the Bible have demonstrably failed; from now on, therefore, willy-nilly, modern man must find his principle of final authority in himself. This, our humanist friend will say, is as true of the modern Christian as it is of the modern atheist. Henceforth, the theist must ground his theism and the Christian his Christianity on the same appeal to the final authority of reason, as the arbiter of fact and the judge of truth, that the atheist makes. And the debate between Christians and non-Christians must henceforth be understood as a debate between two kinds of rationalists, two brands of subjectivists, two groups which, however much their tenets differ, do at least find common ground in their common appeal to the authority of the human intellect. And if our humanist friend is knowledgeable in the realm of theology, he may well try to clinch his point by observing that many theological leaders in Western Protestantism do themselves accept this, and are labouring accordingly to reinterpret the biblical faith on rationalistic lines: which observation is, alas, only too true.

It is beyond our present scope to discuss the phenomenon of nineteenth century biblical criticism in detail; but we cannot let this

view of its significance pass unchallenged. What we are being told here is that the historic view of biblical authority was refuted, and the final authority of reason as a judge of truth was established, by the (alleged) collapse of the Bible under critical probing. But this is a mistake. It cannot be said that these positions were established by the last-century critique of Holy Scripture, for the very good reason that they were in fact the concealed presuppositions of that critique itself. Let us demonstrate this.

Consider the two principles on which the critique was avowedly founded.

The first was that the biblical record needs to be tested by the ordinary methods of historical research, and that we should not accept them as true further than they can be verified by this means. What does this principle imply? It implies that it is an open question whether biblical assertions are true or not. It implies that we are under no obligation to accept what is in the Bible as truth guaranteed to us by the fact of the Bible's divine authorship. In other words, we may regard ourselves as free to discount the testimony of Scripture to its own inspiration, truth, and authority, and to evaluate Scripture in a way which involves denying these aspects of Scripture's evaluation of itself. So the first principle amounts to this: that we are to proceed on the presupposition—we are, in other words, to take it for granted—that the historic view of biblical authority is false.

Such was the first principle. What of the second?

The second principle was that the critical intellect of the scholar has power to discern where the biblical presentation of things is false, and to make a truer reconstruction of what "really" happened, or what God's thoughts and intentions "really" were. In other words, we may set reason to the task of correcting Scripture. So the second principle amounts to this: that we are to proceed on the presupposition—we are, that is, to take it for granted—that reason has final authority as a judge of truth, whereas Holy Scripture has not.

Thus it appears that the conclusions supposed to have been established by last century biblical criticism were really the presuppositions on which it was based. Therefore they cannot be held to have been proved by biblical criticism at all.

How can a presupposition be established? Only by showing that no other presupposition is possible, because all other presuppositions lead to self-contradictory conclusions. Have the presuppositions of the fallibility of Holy Scripture, and the final authority of reason, been established in this way? They have not. Conservative Protestant scholarship has shown abundantly during the past hundred years that the phenomena of Holy Scripture can be accounted for without recourse to these presuppositions, or to any other presuppositions which are not yielded directly by Holy Scripture. It cannot be maintained, therefore, that the presuppositions which underlay last-century biblical criticism were the only possible ones. They were neither necessary nor obligatory; and the mere use of them cannot be held to have established them.

So the significance of last-century biblical criticism was not that it refuted the principle of biblical authority and established the authority

of reason in its place. Its real significance was rather as a sign of the times. The fact that rationalistic criticism could establish itself in Protestant Christendom so triumphantly, and win so many of the best minds in the churches to its support, showed how deeply and thoroughly secular assumptions were permeating the nineteenth century Western mind as a whole. The truth is that secularism laid hold of the entire Western outlook during the last century ; science, philosophy, politics, art, fell under its influence ; and its grip has hardly been loosened yet. The appeal to the authority of reason is, of course, the root-principle of secularism. Hence our present subject has a direct relevance to the troubles of our times. For of this we may be sure : that the apostasy of the Western world will not be brought to an end till the authority of reason is rejected, and the authority of God in Holy Scripture is acknowledged once more.

Such, then, is the contemporary background against which our subject must be set. In the light of it, I want to devote the rest of my time to discussing three themes : (i) : the idea of the authority of reason in religion ; (ii) : the appeal to the authority of reason in Protestant theology ; (iii) : the estimate of the authority of reason in Holy Scripture.

* * * *

The idea of the authority of reason in religion

Our aim in this section is to analyse more closely what is meant by the claim that reason has final authority in the realm of divine things, and to show what is involved in making this claim. We begin by defining our terms.

First, then : what is *reason* ?

In ordinary speech, reason means, first and fundamentally, the power of abstract, analytical thinking. When we speak of the possession of reason as distinguishing man from other animate beings, what we mean is not that animals have no mental processes at all, but that man is the only animate being that can form an abstract idea, construct a definition, analyse a concept, make a generalization, classify, draw inferences, make deductions, conceive hypotheses and means to verify them—in short, do all the things that we lump together under the umbrella-word *ratiocination*. Reason is the faculty whereby man *ratiocinates*.

Why does man ratiocinate ? In obedience to the characteristically human impulse to gain knowledge, to find things out, to understand the how and the why and the wherefore of happenings and phenomena, to make sense of his environment, and, if possible, to learn to control it. The object of reason's quest, in a word, is truth. And the fundamental notion of truth is that of correspondence between man's thoughts and that which is objectively the case.

In the realm where statements can be verified by direct observation, the pursuit of truth presents no apparent theoretical problem. It is not hard, for instance, to verify assertions like " there are more than 80 people in this room ", or " the date today is August 14th " ; nor is it hard to find out the truth about, say, the way that a washing

machine works. But in the realm of ultimate meanings, explanations, and values—the realm to which, of course, all theological statements belong—direct observation cannot guide us, and the determination of truth becomes a theoretical problem at once. Is it possible, we ask, for human reason, unaided, to probe this realm? Here is our humanist friend, who regards the Bible as an exploded fairy story and approaches life without reference to the Word of God—has he a right to assume that his own unaided reason can lead him to truth, and keep him from error, in the realm of ultimate realities and values? I submit that two factors in his situation ought to convince him that he has no right to make any such assumption.

The first is his *lack of a criterion of ultimate truth*. He has no final rational test for truth and falsity in the realm of meaning and value. The principle of coherence—the principle, that is, that all truths are consistent both with themselves and with all other truths—is sometimes invoked as if it could provide such a criterion; but it cannot. It does not follow that because a statement, or set of statements, is internally consistent, and contradicts no truth that we know of, therefore it is true. For it is always possible that it contradicts other truths that we do not yet know of. There was a time when Newton's physics passed the coherence test and were regarded as final; but then further truths about planetary movements were discovered with which Newtonian formulæ were not consistent, and as a result Newton's physics had to be modified by Einstein. There is no guarantee that any man-made view of anything will not sooner or later share a similar fate. Thus it appears that, because we lack omniscience and so never know what facts we shall stumble on next, we are never entitled to regard the coherence test as a final criterion of truth. Later discoveries may force us to abandon the most seemingly solid hypotheses. But if this is so, our humanist friend is evidently left without any conclusive test of ultimate truth at all. Thus he has no right to assume that it is within his power to find out ultimate truth and avoid fundamental error.

Then, in the second place, he needs to bear in mind *the reality of non-rational influences upon his own thinking*, especially in the realm of morality, ideals, and religion. The point here is that reason is not an abstract cosmic principle, pure and inflexible in all its operations, as the Greeks and Hegel, and many after Hegel, supposed; the reason which operates is always some particular person's reason, and the way that each man thinks will depend to a greater or less degree—certainly more than he himself realizes—on the kind of man that he is. Professor Dooyeweerd of Amsterdam and his colleagues are not the only twentieth century thinkers to emphasize that each man's point of view and deepest convictions come out of his *heart*, and express and reveal his inmost being. Modern psychology, in its way, has taught us the same lesson. It has shown us that human ratiocination is profoundly conditioned by unrecognized non-rational factors: temperament and character, physical condition, traumatic experiences which scar the soul, repressions, complexes, reaction to one's upbringing, and the rest. It has made us aware that much of what passes for ratiocination is really rationalization of non-rational impulses. And it has

made it plain that no man living can assess adequately the influence which non-rational factors of this kind are exercising upon his total outlook and way of thinking. Freud interpreted Jewish monotheism as a neurotic obsession, but there are grounds for suspecting that it is rather Freud's own atheism that should be accounted for in this way. Who can tell how far his deepest conscious convictions about God and duty have been determined for him by unconscious factors over which in principle he could exercise no control? Our humanist friend, in particular, has no right to assume that he is exempt from such biasing and deflecting influences. And this is a further reason why he is not entitled to assume that the attainment of ultimate truth lies within his power.

But if there is substance in what we have just said, then the claim that final authority in religion belongs to reason begins to sound rather forlorn.

Consider what this claim means. The word "authority" expresses the idea of a rule that is exercised as of right. That which has authority is entitled to legislate and govern. So the claim that final authority in religion belongs to reason must mean this: that when questions arise concerning God, and our relationship to Him, each man should set up his own reason as judge, and bow to what it says. He must call before him the various witnesses whose testimony bears on the issue—the biblical authors, the Church's tradition, and such individual opinions as seem to him important—and hear them all. But he is to listen to them as a judge listens to evidence, giving no more credence to any of them than the quality of their testimony seems to merit. Man's reason—that is, the thinking individual himself—stands in an autonomous, critical relationship to all the opinions that pass before him. Having heard them, it is now his responsibility to make up his own mind, on the basis of his assessment of the views expressed, and in the light of any relevant convictions and principles of judgment that he may himself have brought to the inquiry. Then he must live by the conclusions he reaches. To claim that final authority in religion belongs to reason is to assert that this is the method by which religious truth is to be sought, and that no other method is legitimate. The claim, in other words, is a demand that every man should act in this way when religious questions press upon him.

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Upon this proposed intellectual method we would pass just four comments:

(i) *See what it presupposes.* It assumes that there is no such thing as immediately accessible revelation from God the Creator. For if there were, then it would at once become man's duty to believe and obey it, to renounce this recommended critical autonomy, and to become a humble pupil of the Word of God. In other words, the claim that reason has final authority in religion presupposes, as we pointed out earlier, that the Bible is not infallible and authoritative Divine truth, but something less.

(ii) *See where this method leads.* Sooner or later, it is bound to issue in a new authoritarianism. This sounds paradoxical, for the envisaged method purports to be the antithesis of all authoritarianism ; but it is none the less an inevitable development. Why? Well, for this reason. Sooner or later, each individual thinker will reach the point where he has to acknowledge that in certain departments of religious study he is not expert enough to have a right to an opinion. Therefore he will resolve to defer to those who in his judgment are experts in it. So before long we shall find our champions of freedom from external authority coming to regard the professional biblical critic, or the religious philosopher, or the oracular ecclesiastic, or the confident preacher, or even the pontifical schoolmaster, in precisely the same way in which Roman Catholics regard the priest and the Pope : namely, as persons whose word is to be taken without demur, because they know what they are talking about. Here is a further illustration of the inexorable law that those who cast off the authority of the Word of God always end up in bondage to the thoughts and words of their fellow-men.

(iii) *See how little hope of success this method has.* From what has been said of the limitations of human reason as a tool for discovering truth, and without reference as yet to the mental effects of sin (that will come later), we are already entitled to ask : is it likely that those who trust to the critical authority of reason will be led by it into all religious truth? Is it not, rather, certain that at the end of their explorations they will find themselves in the state described in I Corinthians i. 21—"the world by wisdom knew not God"? And is it not, therefore, certain, too, that the only fruit of such experiments will be a collapse into scepticism and nihilism, under a crushing sense of reason's failure and bankruptcy? Indeed, we have only to look around us to see proof of this : for did not the intellectual heroics of last century philosophy in the realm of religion give rise to just such a temper of disillusionment in European culture? And is not that temper with us to this day?

(iv) *See how this method differs from that which will be followed by the evangelical Christian, on whose heart God has sealed the authority of His own inspired Word by the testimony of His Holy Spirit.* When facing religious questions, the evangelical Christian also will use his reason, and think hard ; but he will not appeal to his own thoughts as in any way authoritative. In all his thinking, the part he seeks to play will be that of a pupil, not a judge. The whole purpose of his intellectual efforts will be to learn of God, to receive what the Bible teaches, to understand and apply Holy Scripture. He will listen to the words of the biblical writers, not as expressing merely human views of truth, possibly right and possibly wrong, but as God's own words spoken through human lips : words to be believed, treasured, applied and obeyed. In all this, he will not dare to lean to his own understanding, but will pray constantly for Divine teaching ; and his hope of gaining truth from his study of Holy Scripture will rest, not on any confidence in the powers of his own critical intellect, but on his confidence in the power of the Holy Spirit, who inspired the Bible, to interpret it to him. His critical activity in Bible study, therefore, will

take the form, not of judging Holy Scripture by his own thoughts, but of correcting his own thoughts in the light of what the Holy Spirit teaches him through the written Word. There could not be a greater contrast in the realm of intellectual method than that between the consistent evangelical Christian and the protagonist of the authority of reason. And it is now clearer than ever that no compromise is possible between them. To accept either is really to repudiate the other.

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This leads us on to the second of our three subjects :

The appeal to the authority of reason in Protestant theology

Clearly, from what we have said, no such appeal ought ever to be made by Protestant theologians. In fact, however, it has been made, and made in most far-reaching ways, almost since Protestant theology was born. The pattern each time has been the same : current philosophical principles have been taken as axiomatic, without being first tested and corrected by exegesis of Holy Scripture, and then the task of exegesis has itself been re-conceived as one of learning to read the Bible in the light of these principles. In other words, reason has been appealed to to provide the basic categories for biblical interpretation. Exegetes have brought to the Bible a philosophical strait-jacket and squeezed the Bible into it ; or—to illustrate differently—they have played Procrustes, building a bed of philosophical principles, compelling the Bible to lie on it, and ruthlessly twisting and hacking it about, if necessary, in order to make it fit.

The basic perplexities of modern Protestant theology are the direct result of three such episodes—three successive mutilations of the doctrine of God through the intrusion of philosophical principles into biblical exegesis. We may briefly sketch out what these were.

First, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, came the movement of thought which *made God stand back from man*. This was, of course, Arminianism, which read Scripture in the light of the philosophical axiom that man's moral freedom and responsibility are not compatible with divine control of his actions. The Arminians insisted that man acts independently of God, and that man has power to thwart God's plan for his life, and, indeed, for history as a whole, by non-co-operation with God. This was to deny what Reformed theology, following Scripture, had previously taught, namely, that God is Absolute Lord even of free and responsible human actions, as He is of all things beside.

Then, at the end of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth century, came the movement of thought which *made God stand back from His world*. This was English Deism, later exported to provide a theological foundation for the continental Enlightenment. The Deists presupposed the Arminian position, and went further. They read Scripture in the light of the philosophical axiom, drawn from current science, that the universe was to be conceived as a machine, running according to fixed, built-in laws. They pictured God as the Great Mechanic who built the machine, and now stands idle, watching it go. Not only does He not directly control man's actions ; He does not

directly control anything. His role in history is merely that of an interested spectator. This was to deny a further principle which Reformed theology, following Scripture, had previously taught, namely, that God actively energizes and controls all that comes to pass in His world.

This effective dethroning of God was not reversed when later theologians stressed God's immanent presence in His world rather than His transcendent separation from it; for they did nothing to restore His active lordship over it. The change, therefore, was no improvement. It does not, after all, make much difference in practice whether I bar an unwelcome guest out of the house, or lock him in the cellar: and this was really all that the change meant.

Then, in the nineteenth century, the third step was taken: *God was silenced*. This was the contribution of Kant, Schleiermacher, and the Liberals. Liberalism in effect abolished the idea of revelation. It read Scripture in the light of the philosophical axiom that religion is a universal human phenomenon, consisting essentially in a sense of God, having no communicated intellectual content, but evolving as man evolves, and producing in the course of its evolution sacred books, in which this sense of God finds more or less adequate expression. This was to deny the historic Reformed and biblical view, namely, that God has spoken to Man, and the Bible is, quite simply, His own written account of what, by word and action, He has said. For this view was substituted the idea that the Bible is a human testament of religion—a record of pious impressions and human thoughts about God, but no more.

Thus the authority of reason, intruding into Protestant theology, in effect forbade the Creator to do or say anything in His own world. And this was the intellectual legacy—the combined legacy of Arminianism, Deism, and Liberalism—that twentieth century theologians inherited. Hence their perplexities. The dominant figures in modern theology—men like Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, and even Bultmann and Tillich—profess to have reconstruction as their aim, and to be recapturing the lost essence of the biblical faith. But to do this effectively, it is clear that they need to disown the authority of reason and to repair these breaches in the walls of the Christian faith, which a sinful deference to reason has occasioned. Are they, we ask, successfully doing this?

It must be said with regret that on the whole they are not. If I may venture on some provocative generalizations, modern theology presents the spectacle of a kind of intellectual antinomianism. It recognizes its sins, but is not prepared to put them entirely away. It is attempting to recover faith without a complete repentance; to recover the ground that was lost through the three invasions mentioned above without properly repairing the walls, or turning out the invaders. Thus, modern theologians want to recover the reality of revelation in the Bible, and yet they do not want to break with the last century view of the Bible as a fallible and partly untrue record, nor do they want to part company with the philosopher Kant, whose teaching seemed to rule out propositional revelation as impossible. They want to recapture the knowledge of God's sovereignty in the world, and yet they

do not want to break with the accepted modern scientific world-view, although this view has no time, or is supposed, at least, to have no time, for any concept of miracle. In short, the authority of reason has not yet been thoroughly challenged in modern theology; and until it is, evasive interpretations of Scripture and ambiguous theological syntheses will inevitably continue to be the order of the day. No theologian can serve two masters, and not even Bultmann can convince us that it is possible to maintain faith in God the Redeemer while denying God the Creator and the Lord. But we cannot develop these thoughts here.

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We proceed, then, to our third and final subject.

The Estimate of the Authority of Reason in Holy Scripture

Here we raise three questions.

First: Whence comes the impulse, common, as we have seen, to our humanist friends outside the Church and to a great number of theologians within the Church—common, indeed, to us all, though some of us try to resist it—to trust and follow the leading of human reason in matters of religion, rather than be content simply to take God's word for things? Whence, in other words, comes the impulse to exalt reason over revelation, and the sense of outrage which is so widely felt when the authority of reason in religion is challenged?

Answer: This spirit springs from *sin*. To doubt revelation in favour of a private hunch was the sin into which Satan led Eve, and Eve's children have been committing the same sin ever since the fall. The impulse to indulge oneself in believing something other than what God has said is an expression of the craving to be independent of God, which is the essence of sin. The attempt to know all things, including God, by reason, without reference to revelation, is the form that this craving for independence takes in the intellectual realm; just as the attempt to win heaven by works and effort, without grace, is the form that it takes in the moral realm. Pride prompts fallen mankind to go about, not merely to establish their own righteousness, but also to manufacture their own wisdom. The quest all along is for self-sufficiency: our sinful arrogance prompts us to aspire after independence of God in the realm of knowledge. We want to be intellectually autonomous, intellectually self-made men. This is a sin of which we need to repent, and of which the Gospel commands us to repent. The Gospel not only tells us that it is useless to seek righteousness by works, and commands us to stop doing it, and to put faith in the Lord Jesus Christ as our righteousness with God; the Gospel also, and fundamentally, is a message that tells us that it is useless to seek the truth about God by speculation, and it comes to us as a command to stop speculating, and to put faith in what God has said, simply on the grounds that it is He, the God of truth, who has said it. The Gospel, in other words, repudiates absolutely the authority of reason, and demands implicit subjection to God's revealed truth. It is a summons to repentance on the intellectual plane no less than on the moral plane. And this is why it appeared "foolishness" to the Greeks (I Cor. i. 23), and why

it still appears foolishness to their intellectual descendants in the modern world.

Second : What results from setting up the authority of human reason in the realm of religion ?

Answer : The result is *ignorance of God*, and *idolatry*—nothing more, and nothing less. In the pagan Gentile world, possessing only God's general revelation of Himself through nature and conscience, this ignorance becomes complete, and this idolatry absolute. So it was in the pagan world of Paul's day, and so it is among unevangelized pagan tribes today. The formula that covers this state of affairs is that of I Cor. i. 21 : "The world by wisdom knew not God". "Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and fourfooted beasts, and creeping things" (Rom. i. 22f.). Whether the pagans are cultured, like the Greeks, or uncultured, like the South American Indians, makes no significant difference to the situation. Fallen man's reason is blind through sin, so that no amount of reasoning unaided by the Holy Spirit can find out God. Fallen man's reason is, moreover, the servant of a sinful heart, which does not like to retain God in its knowledge (Rom. i. 28), and labours accordingly to turn the light of general revelation into darkness. Thus men "hold down the truth in unrighteousness" (Rom. i. 18, R.V.), and out of their hearts, through the perverting of general revelation, come false gods of all sorts. The hands and minds of men make gods in man's own image, or in the image of something lower than man ; and the service of such gods leads to self-debasement, and immorality, and crime, and shame (Rom. i. 26-32).

And in the churches, where Gospel light has shone, the only result of paying attention to speculative theology, and allowing private guesses and hunches to determine one's faith to any degree, is ignorance of God, misconceptions of Christ, misdirection of worship, and ethical aberrations, so that one's Christianity is more or less impoverished and distorted. The second chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians bears much pondering in this connection.

Third : What will break men of the habit of looking to the authority of reason in religion ?

Answer : Only *regeneration* will break it in the natural man, and only *revival* will break it in a degenerate church.

Fallen man cannot of himself escape from bondage to sin. Sin he must, whatever he does. It is not in him to acknowledge God's authority ; it is not in him to receive God's truth when it is presented to him. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned" (1 Cor. ii. 14). What can cure his condition ? Only *regeneration*. Only the man who is born again of the Spirit of God will repent of the sin of intellectual self-sufficiency, and consent to be taught of God through His written Word. As Calvin insisted, it is one of the marks of the Christian man that he is convinced, through the Spirit's inner witness, of the divinity and authority of Holy Scripture, and subjects his mind and binds his conscience to it.

But sin remains in the regenerate, in the mind no less than in the members. And when the fires of spiritual life burn low in the Church, the sinful lust for intellectual autonomy reasserts itself. The intellectual apostasy of Western Christendom in recent years is not unconnected with its spiritual lethargy and barrenness : each has both fostered, and been fostered by, the other. What can cure this condition ? Only *revival*. Only a new outpouring of spiritual life can clear the spiritual vision, and bring home to the minds of Christians the power, the authority, and the meaning of " God's Word written ", and enable them to see their mental sins, their intellectual compromises and betrayals of truth, for what they are, and give them strength of mind to repent and cast the sinful ways of thinking out. Only revival will bring a moribund Church to subject its thoughts effectively to Holy Scripture, and enable it to apprehend truly and deeply the riches of Christ, " in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge " (Col. ii. 3), and to bring " every thought into captivity to Christ " (II Cor. x. 5). There is no question that this is the most urgent and crying need of Protestant Christendom today.

May God revive His work in His Church in this day of wrath, that His people may once again learn to think and live to His honour and glory.



Church Courts

With particular reference to the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure

BY MALCOLM MCQUEEN

ON July 4th, 1961, the Church Courts Commission presented the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure to the Church Assembly which, after a day's debate, gave it General Approval, remitting the Measure to a Revision Committee. So a considerable milestone has been reached by the formulation of this important Measure, representing the most extensive overhaul of the ecclesiastical judicial system for several centuries.

The not unrelated subjects of the relationship between Church and State and of Church Courts have between them occasioned a plethora of reports during the past century. In the latter instance a Royal Commission produced a Special Report in 1831 dealing with the final court of appeal in ecclesiastical cases, and in 1832 a General Report from which emanated considerable parliamentary legislation. Such well known acts as the Church Discipline Act, 1840, the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, and later the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892, appeared on the Statute Book. Since 1883 seven commissions have, in whole or in part, reported on the system of church courts with proposals for change, namely, the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts, 1883; the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, 1906; the Church Assembly Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts, 1926; the Archbishops' Commission on Church and State, 1935; the Archbishops' Commission on Canon Law, 1947; the Church Assembly Commission on Church and State, 1952; and the Archbishops' Commission on Ecclesiastical Courts, 1954, usually known as the Lloyd Jacob Report (after its chairman, Mr. Justice Lloyd Jacob). To hope to grapple with this complicated matter of courts without the aid of this last Report would be to make one's task extremely difficult. Whatever may be thought of its recommendations the Report is an invaluable book on every aspect of this subject and repays most careful study. I shall draw extensively (and gratefully) on it, but even within the generous confines of this article much must be left unwritten. I leave for instance the history of ecclesiastical courts to the first twenty pages of the Lloyd Jacob Report, whilst the interested reader will find a great deal else beyond this article set down within its eighty pages.

The 1832 Commission's main recommendations were on clergy discipline, which was in future to be dealt with by a separate procedure and by separate courts. Thus there evolved a dual system of courts, on the one hand the ancient Consistory Court at the diocesan level with appeals first to the court of the particular province (the Court of Arches for Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York) and then to the Privy

Council, and, on the other hand, the system for clergy discipline, such offences being divided into two groups : (i) doctrinal, ritual, and ceremonial ; (ii) moral, unbecoming conduct, and neglect of duty. Offences in the first group are, broadly speaking, dealt with under the Church Discipline Act, 1940, and the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, the provincial court being the court of first instance with appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Offences in the second group come under the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892. These trials are held in the Consistory Court, with appeals either to the provincial court or to the Privy Council. Further discipline measures have been enacted in the past fifteen years by the Incumbents (Discipline) Measure, 1947, and the Church Dignitaries (Retirement) Measure, 1949, whilst in 1951 the Bishops (Retirement) Measure was passed. In all, each diocese now has four courts and five quasi-courts (in which the bishop can pronounce sentence with the accused's consent) and each province has six courts. Well might the Lloyd Jacob Commission, having surveyed the scene, use the phrase "a jungle of courts" to describe the present situation.

Two particular and subsequently controversial elements in this structure must be noticed. By the Privy Council Appeals Act, 1832, the Crown's appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (as already mentioned) with a view to strengthening the law. Many in the Church have subsequently disliked church appeals in the last resort being considered by lay members of a body, however distinguished, that need not comprise churchmen, and have consequently disowned its verdicts. As a result the subject of the final court of appeal has been prominent and contentious in the deliberations of the various commissions (even when specifically omitted from terms of reference) and was indeed an important item in the discussions of the recent Church Courts Commission. Since 1883 each report, with one exception, has agreed that there should be a final court of appeal, and that that final court should not be the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The 1883, 1906, and 1926 Reports provided for a court consisting of lay judges who, in various circumstances, could consult the archbishops and bishops. The 1935, 1947, and 1952 Reports provided for a court consisting of laymen and bishops, the 1935 and 1952 Reports recommending two lay and two ordained members, the 1947 Report adding to this number the archbishop of the province in question. How the Church Courts Commission dealt with this problem will be shown in due course.

The other controversial factor has been the bishop's veto. It is obviously both proper and desirable that the bishop should play some initial part in any proceedings against his clergy, but there are those who feel that the power of the bishop's veto is too comprehensive and final. By the Church Discipline Act, 1840, the veto is absolute with no requirement to state reasons. By the Public Regulation Act, 1874, reasons must be given in writing, whilst under the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892, the veto is limited to cases that the bishop considers too trivial or vague to warrant proceedings. The views of the various reports are clearly summarized by the Lloyd Jacob Report : "The 1883 Report proposed (with seven dissentients) that in all clergy

discipline cases the bishop's veto should be retained, on the ground that it was best for the bishop, rather than any private person, to decide whether in any particular case the best interests of the Church were served by the institution of proceedings against a clergyman. The 1947 Report agreed with that of 1883 that the bishop's right of veto should be absolute. But both the 1906 and 1926 Reports thought that in doctrinal and ritual cases the veto might be abolished; the 1906 Report conditionally on the law of public worship being altered to allow reasonable variety, subject to the regulations of the bishops as a body, and the 1926 Report conditionally on this state of affairs being achieved through revision of the Prayer Book. The 1926 Report especially emphasized the importance of retaining the veto in cases of alleged misconduct on the part of a clergyman, on the ground that 'painful experience shows that the clergy in the fulfilment of their duties are peculiarly liable to malicious charges and prosecutions from which the bishop's veto is their only protection'. To underline their agreement with this last sentiment the Lloyd Jacob Commission proposed that the restriction on the veto to cases of frivolity and vagueness should be lifted, so allowing the bishop to exercise his veto absolutely in conduct cases (other arrangements being recommended for doctrinal cases). It will be seen later that this subject of the veto provoked a difference within the Church Courts Commission.

The main principles upon which the Lloyd Jacob Commission worked and their consequent recommendations, form the basis of the proposed Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure. These principles can be summarized as follows. First, the maintenance of the distinction between conduct cases and cases involving doctrine, ritual, and ceremony (known as reserved cases). The relevant draft canons as contained in the 1947 Report would have abolished this distinction. Secondly, the need to reduce drastically the number of courts. Thirdly, provision of a system reasonably hopeful of gaining the Church's confidence. Fourthly, the desirability of including all clergymen of every rank within the reconstructed system of clergy discipline. In conduct cases the Commission recommended one diocesan court, the Consistory, with appeal to the provincial court and with no further appeal possible. Because these cases might be criminal suits, the Commission recommended that the laity should be included in the composition of the Investigating Committee, which would decide whether or not a *prima facie* case existed against the accused. The chairman should therefore be a person legally qualified and a communicant member of the Church of England, whilst the committee should consist of three clergymen and three laymen (with experience in criminal law). In reserved cases the Commission felt strongly that to judicial experience must be added spiritual authority in the form of bishops and convocations each playing an active role in these trials. The Commission therefore proposed one court for the whole Church to be known as the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, with no case being tried by this court until a Convocation Court of Inquiry had first been held and agreed that the case should proceed. Having regard to the authority which the Commission envisaged in this new court, the Lloyd Jacob Commission departed from the recommendations in

principle of its predecessors, and maintained that no appeal from its judgments should be considered necessary. (Any person, of course, has the right to apply to the High Court of Justice if there is a sense of lack of justice or abuse of proceedings.) Complaints of an alleged offence in either the conduct or reserved category must be made within three years, and persons qualified to lodge a complaint should be restricted to any person appointed by the bishop (probably the archdeacon), a churchwarden, three communicant members on the electoral roll, or the patron of the benefice.

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Now to pass to the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure itself. Its terms of reference which form the preamble to the Measure include : "To reform and reconstruct the system of ecclesiastical courts of the Church of England, to replace with new provisions the existing enactments relating to ecclesiastical discipline, to abolish certain jurisdictions and fees. . . ." It is only possible here to refer to the Measure's leading provisions (and omitting certain qualifications to these) for the Measure contains no less than eighty clauses.

Part I deals with the Courts, their judges and jurisdiction. The Consistory Court, now the only court at diocesan level (the others have not been specified in this article) is the court of first instance against clergymen for offences not being doctrinal, ritual, or ceremonial, and for faculty cases. Its judge is the chancellor of the diocese, appointed by the bishop, and either a barrister-at-law of seven years' minimum standing, or having held high judicial office. He sits with four assessors (two ordained, two lay) who decide questions of fact with him, whilst questions of law are decided by the chancellor alone. The Arches Court of Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York are respectively the archbishop's court in each province, hearing appeals from the Consistory Court other than faculty ones involving doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial. The judges are five in number, being a barrister of at least ten years' standing, or of high judicial office and acting as judge in both courts, known as Dean of the Arches in Canterbury and as Auditor in York; two clerks in Holy Orders for each province, appointed by the Prolocutor of the respective Convocation Lower House; and two laymen of judicial experience appointed by the Chairman of the House of Laity.

Five judges constitute the judges of the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved to be appointed by Her Majesty, two from persons who have held high judicial office, and three who are or have been diocesan bishops. Besides hearing cases of doctrine, ritual and ceremonial, this court is concerned with suits of duplex querela (suits relating to refusal to institute to a living) and with faculty case appeals in which doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial is involved. Other faculty appeals will continue to be heard by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which in future will cease to have any jurisdiction in discipline cases.

The Measure makes specific provision for a final court of appeal from the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved. This final court consists of five persons nominated by Her Majesty, of whom three are

Lords of Appeal who declare that they have been confirmed in the Church of England, and two lords spiritual sitting as Lords of Parliament.

Parts II and III concern Offences and the Institution of Proceedings. The offences under the Measure are the same as under the present law, being matters relating to doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial, and other offences which include unbecoming conduct and serious, persistent, or continuous neglect of duty. Proceedings are excluded where political opinions or activities are involved; and in the case of doctrine, ritual, and ceremony, proceedings are instituted only if the offence was committed in the Provinces of Canterbury or York. In other cases the location of the offence carries no restriction. A time limit of three years is laid down as recommended by the Lloyd Jacob Commission, but the categories of qualified complainants differ slightly. In the case of priests or deacons the complaint may be laid by a person authorised by the diocesan bishop; against incumbents or assistant curates, complaints can be laid by six persons or more of full age, whose names are on the parochial roll, whilst the incumbent of the benefice concerned can institute proceedings against an assistant curate.

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Parts IV and V provide for the conduct of proceedings against bishops, priests, and deacons, for offences not involving doctrine, ritual, and ceremonial; Part VI for offences that do involve these categories. For space and other reasons the proposed procedure against archbishops and bishops in conduct cases is omitted from this article. After the lodging of a complaint against priests and deacons for misconduct or neglect of duty, the bishop has the initial duty of interviewing the complainant and the accused in private, after which he can decide either to allow the complaint to proceed, or that no further steps be taken. In the former instance, the case is referred to the diocesan Investigating Committee, consisting of the lay chairman, three clergymen, and one layman. It will be noticed that this differs from the Lloyd Jacob Commission which recommended three lay members. The Church Assembly at the time expressed some objection to the Lloyd Jacob suggestion, as this would mean that the clerical element on the committee would be in the minority, and only clergy were the proper judges of the conduct of their brethren. The Church Courts Commission differed in their opinion of this, the majority favouring the inclusion of only one lay member (excluding the legal chairman) whilst others maintained that the committee's function was not to decide on whether conduct was becoming or unbecoming, but whether a *prima facie* case existed to put the accused on trial. If the Investigating Committee decides that a case is established the bishop will have now no power of vetoing the consequent proceedings, since the trial must then be held. However, when a complaint has been duly laid and substantiated, the bishop can pronounce sentence after consultation with the complainant and agreement by the accused. Thereupon the case is closed.

As soon as a complaint is lodged against priests and deacons in doctrine, ritual, and ceremonial cases, the diocesan bishop must con-

sider it, and after giving the complainant and the accused the opportunity of seeing him, the bishop shall either refer the case to the Convocation Committee of Inquiry, or veto any further action. The provincial committee concerned, consisting of one member of the Convocation Upper House, two proctors of the Lower House, and two diocesan chancellors, has the task of deciding by a majority vote whether there is sufficient evidence to put the accused on trial. It is important to note that even when the committee decides that there is sufficient evidence for a case to proceed, it may stop any further proceedings on the grounds that the offence is too trivial, or that it was committed under extenuating circumstances, or that further proceedings would not be in the interests of the Church of England. Otherwise the accused is tried before the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved, which in general will conduct its proceedings similarly to courts for conduct cases. The court must sit with not less than three or more than five assessors drawn from a panel of theologians and liturgiologists. An appeal involving doctrine to the new final court of appeal will mean that this commission will sit with five members of either of the Upper Houses of Convocation, or of eminent theologians who will give such advice to the court on the doctrinal matters in question as the commission may require.

Neither the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved nor the Commission shall be bound by any decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in regard to matters of doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial. For many this will not make agreeable reading. It was not really necessary to state this qualification in the Measure, as the institution of a new system of courts precludes any such binding, but the clause was added for clarity's sake and to assuage any doubts felt by those who will not accept the Privy Council's judgments. When speaking in the Church Assembly I took the opportunity of observing that even though the proposed new courts will not be bound, there is nothing, so far as I am aware, to prevent these courts having regard to the Privy Council's judgments.

The inquiry and trial procedure in an archbishop's or bishop's case follows the same lines as that for a priest or deacon, except, of course, that no bishop's veto operates, whilst the Convocation Committee of Inquiry consists of an even number of members of the relevant Upper Convocation House, together with the Dean of the Arches and Auditor.

Part VII deals with commissions of review, to which some reference has already been made. Part VIII is concerned with Censures. Except for the abolition of excommunication, the censures remain the same as under the existing law. Guilt of an offence laid down in the Measure renders liability to any of the following penalties : (i) Deprivation, namely, removal from present or future preferment, unless otherwise permitted by a bishop and archbishop ; (ii) Inhibition, being disqualification from exercising any functions for a specific time ; (iii) Suspension, namely, disqualification for a specified period from performing any right or duty incidental to the preferment, unless the bishop permits, or from residing in the preferment residence ; (iv) Monition, being an order to do or refrain from doing a specific act ; (v) Rebuke. In accordance with the Lloyd Jacob Commission's

recommendation, the penalty for a first offence in doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial cases shall not be more than monition. The bishop has power to depose in the case of deprivation, and (a new provision) an archbishop or bishop can likewise be deposed on a resolution of the relevant Upper House of Convocation, but before such censure of deprivation or sentence of deposition is effective, confirmation must be obtained from Her Majesty by Order in Council. When a clerk in Holy Orders is accused of an offence under the Measure, or of any criminal offence in a temporal court, and the bishop considers that in the best interests of the Church he should not perform his duties pending proceedings, a notice can be served on the clerk inhibiting him from taking any of the services.

Part IX relates to Automatic Deprivation following conviction of certain criminal offences or certain immoral acts. In particular, automatic deprivation is to be operative if a decree of divorce or of judicial separation has been pronounced against a clergyman on any ground now available in either instance other than unsoundness of mind. (This clause caught the eye of the popular Press when the Measure was made public.) In earlier debates some disquiet was expressed in the Church Assembly, and it was argued that automatic suspension and not deprivation would be more appropriate, with power given to the bishop to consider the case and deprive if he thought fit. But the Church Courts Commission were of the opinion that this laid an undesirable burden on the bishop, besides which such deprivation did not mean that a future preferment might not be held (with episcopal sanction). The Lloyd Jacob Commission recommended that a bishop should be able to deprive a clergyman who remarries after divorce, or who marries a divorced woman, if in either instance the former spouse is living. The Church Assembly supported this view, but the Courts Commission, whilst expressing disapproval in principle of such marriages, felt that it would be difficult to request Parliament to agree to such a procedure over a course of action that is lawful for the general public.

Part X sets up a Legal Aid Fund to be maintained by the Church Assembly and the Church Commissioners if they think fit, with contributions from each of these bodies. At the same time, power is given to the courts to make an order for payment of costs against either party to a proceedings even when any proposed action is not eventually taken or defended.

Part XI institutes a Rule Committee and sets down its functions.

Part XII is Miscellaneous and General.

Of the four Schedules to the Measure it might be mentioned that the Fourth contains a list of existing enactments for repeal in whole or in part, some fifty in all, from the time of Edward I.

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It is not for me to predict how the Measure will look in its ultimate form after it has been studied by the Assembly at the Revision and Final Approval stages, but as I have previously indicated, the important subjects of the final court of appeal and of the bishop's veto,

require further comment in order to assess the trends of thought behind the Measure.

The Lloyd Jacob Report had been the subject of a good debate in the Assembly in 1954, with a further debate in 1956 which was devoted specifically to this problem of a final court. Those who were present on that latter occasion will not readily forget Archbishop Lord Fisher's spirited defence of the Privy Council. However, the Assembly by a majority—and let it be noted that the minority was a substantial one—followed the line of the successive reports in its rejection of the Judicial Committee. The Church Courts Commission, therefore, had to take these views into account. Agreement in the Commission was eventually reached that the final court should consist of five members, but whether the composition should be three bishops and two lay judges, or *vice versa*, revealed a cleavage of opinion which in turn reflected the Anglo-Catholic and Evangelical outlooks. The former maintained that as the court might have to pronounce a legally binding judgment on what is the Church's doctrine, and as the bishops are the guardians of that doctrine, they should be in the majority. Besides, interpretation of theological documents often required a special knowledge of doctrine and theology with which a lawyer would probably not be adequately equipped. The other viewpoint on the Commission favoured three lay judges, contending that a court's decisions must be based on law and not policy, and that strict legal principles must therefore predominate. As I told the Assembly, I understood it to be fundamental to the system of jurisprudence in this country that law was interpreted by lawyers, trained for that purpose, and that ecclesiastical jurisprudence was a part of that system. Thus the final court of appeal must be a court of law, and that law must be certain of capable and clear interpretation, since the power of the courts to deprive a man of his living and livelihood should not be underestimated. In eventually recommending to the Assembly the acceptance of three lay judges and two bishops, the Commission expressed the belief that the judges and the bishops would work together with understanding, and pointed out that in doctrinal cases the court would be advised by the panel of bishops and theologians for which the Measure made provision. The court would also have before it the decision of the Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved with its majority of three bishops to two lay judges. Notwithstanding the implications of these remarks, I believe that Evangelicals may indeed be satisfied if the lay majority in this court can be secured.

The retention or abolition of the bishop's veto in doctrinal, ritual, and ceremonial cases divided the Courts Commission. (All, I believe agreed that in conduct cases it was necessary.) The disagreement over the veto was such that four of us members felt bound to record that division in the form of a dissent. Clause 37(1) (a) empowers the bishop to decide if he thinks fit that no further step be taken against a priest or deacon in these cases. Those favouring this retention of the veto take their stand on supporting the present law, maintaining that without the veto clergymen would be subject to trivial or vindictive charges, especially owing to the divergence between law and practice in public worship. When the law has been brought up to

date the need for the veto might cease, but that situation has not been reached. Both the supporters and the opponents of the veto referred to the Lloyd Jacob Report in arguing their case. That Report observed that whilst divergence between law and practice exists and continues, the proposed procedure for dealing with ritual and ceremonial cases should remain subject to the Church Discipline Act 1840, and the Public Worship Regulation Act, 1874, thus attracting the bishop's veto. At the same time it was eventually desirable to place the procedure on a wider basis of inquiry for all three cases than the present system permitted—hence the proposed Convocation Court of Inquiry. In the Assembly I readily agreed that some form of inquiry was necessary to meet a complainant's right, and that some form of veto was required to safeguard an accused against wrongfulness. Yet the Measure's safeguards were indeed extensive—qualified complainants at the outset, and in spite of a *prima facie* case being proved three wide (some would say too wide) powers of dismissal by the Convocation Committee of Inquiry. The Lloyd Jacob Commission had rightly stressed the pastoral role that the bishop should play by endeavouring to settle the dispute amicably in private, and had suggested that a month should be allowed for this attempt. Moreover, the set-up for reserved cases was on a national basis, affecting the whole Church. To retain, therefore, a personal and diocesan veto, not uniform and varying from diocese to diocese, was to cut right across an important new principle embodied in the more representative Convocation Committee. Furthermore, although the Lloyd Jacob Report contained the proviso concerning the law and practice, yet that commission proposed that doctrinal cases should forthwith be subject to the new procedure of the Convocation Committee and freed from the bishop's veto. The Measure, on the other hand, contains no such proviso, so that, if passed in its present form, all three cases (doctrinal, ritual, and ceremonial) affecting priests and deacons, will be subjected to a *double* veto, bishop's and convocation's. The encouraging Evangelical lay support in the Assembly strengthens my belief that the opportunity should now be taken to abolish the bishop's comprehensive veto (other and adequate safeguards being provided), particularly as the Church's confidence is being sought for the proposed new courts.

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In concluding this article I want to stress briefly the contemporary setting in which the revision of the Church's courts should be viewed for whilst the proposed system of courts can be examined in isolation it would be unwise not to recognize it as part of a larger picture. It is no exaggeration to say that the revision of the canons has made this revision of the courts complementary and inevitable. That popular phrase "the mind of the Church" requires today a wider set of ecclesiastical laws and a more autonomous system of administering them. The new courts and the personnel for staffing them may (or may not) gain the confidence of clergy and laity, but it is certain that without a change in the law to be administered the Measure will find little favour. (We may deplore this outlook but we cannot deny

it.) Page 73 of the Lloyd Jacob Report sets this down with a frankness that is at least commendable, even though its reasoning and aim provokes radical disagreement : " In this connection it is encouraging to note signs of better things. In the process of revising the canons the Convocations and the House of Laity of the Church Assembly have agreed in principle to the draft Canon XIII, Of Lawful Authority, under which optional or temporary variations from the forms of service ordered by the Book of Common Prayer can be given lawful authority. This machinery should enable the Church to bring to an end some of the divergence between the law and practice of its public worship. Another new canon (no. XVII), Of the Vesture of Ministers during the Time of Divine Service, will, if it becomes law, abrogate the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in *Hebbert v. Purchas* (1871), L.R. 3 P.C. 605, and *Ridsdale v. Clifton* (1877), 2 P.D. 276, that a clergyman, while officiating at Holy Communion, is not permitted to wear a chasuble, and so make legal what for years has been a widespread practice. But these two canons are not more than a beginning in the work of revising the Church's ritual and ceremonial law, a work which we consider essential, if as the Church Assembly desired . . . proper provision is to be made for the trial of offences against the law. We venture to hope that the Convocations and the House of Laity of the Church Assembly will take the opportunity afforded by the revision of the Canons of repealing by Canon or Measure those parts of the ritual and ceremonial law which are no longer observed and over which recourse to a court of law would not now be thought proper. For the successful working of a court for the correction of ritual and ceremonial offences, not only must the law of public worship be related to present-day practice, but it must be framed in such a way that the full width of Church tradition will find a place in its framework, and full allowance be made for variations in ceremonial necessitated by local circumstances.

" Against this background we would desire to see a renewed appreciation of uniformity as a principle of liturgical worship. The law should be obeyed, not because of the sentence imposed in an ecclesiastical court on conviction of an offence against it, but because uniformity in public worship is itself a thing of value. . . ." (These last sentiments will find an echo in many hearts.)

Should then the law be changed to make the Measure's proposals effective? On the contrary, but the one is intimately linked with the other. The Measure may reach the Statute Book in advance of changes in the law. A motion was therefore moved in the Church Assembly to provide that those sections dealing with offences involving matters of doctrine, ritual, or ceremonial, should not come into force earlier than six months after the canons dealing with Lawful Authority have been promulged. This was not approved, but it should not be assumed that the Church would be content for long to regard such cases as being better dealt with under the new Measure if the law remains unchanged.

The main subject of this article is a piece of legal and administrative machinery, but it is grounded also in deep principles. Every opportunity must therefore be seized of ensuring that the Evangelical voice

of conviction is heard in the central councils of the Church. (There have lately been some encouraging instances of such positive and effective contributions.) May God give strength and guidance for the witness and work that lie ahead, that fundamental scriptural principles are not jeopardized, and that true justice is dispensed by means of this Measure.

The Thirty-Nine Articles: Their Value in the Twentieth Century

BY JOHN TILLER

A PART from an occasional outburst, such as those made recently by the Dean of St. Paul's,¹ when for a moment we wonder again whether the Church has *ipso facto* excommunicated itself by the terms of its own Fifth Canon, it has become increasingly clear since the war that the painful tension in which the Thirty-Nine Articles held many an unhappy subscribing cleric has been resolved. This is not to say that any enactment or official announcement by voice of authority has granted relief to troubled consciences. Far from it: outwardly all remains exactly as before. Nor has there been any change of character in the clergy themselves leading to a universal and wholehearted acceptance of the Articles. On the contrary, what has been agreed upon is that adverse after-effects from the bitter pill of subscription should be avoided by dissolving it in the waters of Lethe. The Articles themselves have been banished by ignorance and forgetfulness from the councils and pulpits of the Church, except when formal occasion demands otherwise. No mention is made of the Articles during negotiations with the other Churches: the doctrinal confession of the Church of England is considered certain to be irrelevant, or at any rate an inconvenient hindrance to close understanding and ultimate unity.

Failing to find any agreed form of doctrine, then, do our Christian brethren from elsewhere seek to investigate our past in an attempt to discover where we stand? As like as not they will be informed that ours is not a confessional church.²

In this situation we have cause to be grateful to those like Dean Matthews, because at least they remind us that the problem really still exists of Articles subscribed to, but not believed in or obeyed. And it

is obvious on grounds of intellectual, moral, and spiritual integrity that it is better to revise the Articles than to pretend that they do not exist. Few, however, would be inclined to suggest that at the present moment there is sufficient theological agreement in the Church of England for a successful revision to be attempted. We are left with two alternatives. Subscription might be abolished entirely, leaving the Articles as no more than an important historical document and the Church as destitute of a confession as is often pretended already. Or the Articles might be once more affirmed as adequate for their purpose, and that purpose declared necessary for the good order of the Church. These are diametrically opposed courses of action. In this essay the latter step is advocated, and it is clear that this will involve an examination of the criticisms that subscription is unnecessary, or even unethical, and that the Articles are in any case out of date and irrelevant.

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After all, why not solve the problem at one step by doing away with subscription? Several reasons are urged in favour of this course. First, the fundamental importance of liberty of thought in the realm of theology is stressed. This, of course, is an argument which applies equally well to the abolition of the ecumenical creeds; it takes us to a religion of experience and out of sight of Christ and the historic Christian creed. The people who make this argument are in a position clearly stated by James Denney: "The problem is to find a way of securing two things: the unreserved recognition of the place which Christ has always held in evangelical faith and entire intellectual freedom in thinking out what this implies".³ Denney goes on to attempt a solution based upon the requirement of a common allegiance to Christ, but it is not possible to separate Christ from His Gospel, and this involves belief in a number of doctrines: "There cannot be a gospel . . . without an antecedent creed or body of belief".⁴ The truth of this is testified by the fact that we can speak of a New Testament "kerygma": it has been a plain fact of the Church's experience. Neither is it possible to accept the ecumenical creeds alone on the grounds that they confine themselves to the historical truths of Christianity. Not only is this inaccurate, but the historical events themselves are viewed by these creeds every bit as much from the standpoint of the Christian Gospel as is the case with the later confessions of faith. Any creed designed for subscription might, of course, be unpardonably detailed in its delineation of doctrine, and we shall have to consider whether the Thirty-Nine Articles may be criticized fairly on this ground. At the time of the Reformation, such confessions proliferated and there was some truth in the sarcasm of Erasmus: "The Christian Creed began to reside in writings rather than in men's minds, and there were well nigh as many faiths as there were men. Articles grew but sincerity declined. Contention boiled over, charity was frozen . . . Thousands of articles of faith rushed into publicity".⁵ It was easy at such a time to insist upon fixing doctrines too precisely. But the mainspring of all this activity was the truth which Luther had grasped: "Christians need certainty, definite dogmas, a sure word of God, which they can trust to live and die by".⁶ As one such definition

of dogma, our Articles are wonderfully restrained. This is all the more remarkable because, as Hoskyns reminds us: "If you read the Thirty-Nine Articles, you are not reading a theological discourse spun out of the quiet, reflective training of men remote from the world. You are reading statements wrung out of controversy; more than that, wrung passionately out of the complete insecurity of life, and written in the blood of men".⁷ Yet compared with, say, the Westminster Confession of Faith, we see at once their suitability as articles designed for subscription, however superior the presbyterian confession may be as a *summa theologica*. An obvious example is Article XVII. Bishop Ryle, in his tract on Election,⁸ notices the scriptural restraint of this Article, in which a principle is laid down which applies also to the code as a whole: "We must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in Holy Scripture: and, in our doings, that will of God is to be followed which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God". And Article VI makes it plain that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of the Faith". This rule of the Articles applies to the Articles themselves. They are not to bind us, even when we have subscribed to them, any more than Scripture itself. In other words, subscription leaves us with as much intellectual freedom as we had before with that reverent submission to "God's word written" which is the starting point of all constructive Christian theology. We deplore those who, as Bacon put it, "delight in giddiness, and count it a bondage to fix a belief".

A second suggested reason for doing away with subscription is that at present the Articles, as already mentioned, are felt to be a hindrance to union with other branches of the Church. Why, it is asked, should we be tied to the divisions of our forefathers? There in the pages of the different confessions the old controversies linger on, blighting the efforts at reunion of later generations. If it be objected that we must know where we stand before we can decide on what ground reunion would be acceptable, the answer is given that the ecumenical creeds would do very well as a basis of faith for a reunited Church (whether this is true we shall consider in a moment); and that in any case the Church of England has laid down its terms as regards reunion, and they are not the Thirty-Nine Articles. All the conversations which have taken place during this century have had as their basis some form or other of the famous Lambeth Quadrilateral. This is so; but what those four points define is not Anglicanism. They represent part of a general ecumenical escapade which does not bother to be reconciled with the past. This past is particularly enshrined in creeds and confessions which are always "wrung out of controversy", when truth needs safeguarding. Thus it is inadequate, for example, to define historic Anglicanism in terms of the Prayer Book alone. For one thing, Articles and Prayer Book are the products of one reforming movement, in fact of one group of Reformers. They are twin rocks in the foundations of Anglicanism. "Any Prayer Book which does not contain the Articles is a most imperfect, mutilated, and barely honest copy of the Liturgy".⁹ Thus it is sheer disregard of the history of the

Church of England to neglect the Articles. "Cranmer, and Laud, and the latitudinarian Burnet, and the eighteenth and nineteenth century Evangelicals, and the Tractarians, and Pusey, and the judges who gave verdicts in the heresy and ritual trials of the last century . . . will tell us . . . historic Anglicanism is not just a style of worship ; it is also, and fundamentally, a confessional position."¹⁰

Apart from the present situation, it would be amazing that anyone could dream otherwise. The need which the Articles were intended to meet is clearly stated by Archbishop Parker : "For want of plain certainty of Articles of doctrine by law to be declared, great distraction and dissension of minds is at this time present among your subjects".¹¹ "That the Articles were intended to be the legal and authorized statement and test of Church of England doctrine on all subjects treated in them is quite clear from all we know of their origin, history, and purpose".¹² The confessional position of the Anglican Church as stated in the Articles was established, as the Reformers and later writers frequently pointed out, mid-way between the extremes of Romanism and the ultra-Protestant sects. And this is Anglicanism : this is that celebrated *via media*, the very thing which is claimed to qualify our Church to plan a special part in the work of reunion.¹³ Surely, so far from forgetting the Articles in our ecumenical discussions, we ought instead to keep a very firm hold upon them, to ensure that we remain true to that *via media* which is our confessional position and vocation ; lest, talking to some Churches with one type of face, and to others with an altogether different one, we find instead that our *via media* has simply become being all things to all men.

At this point, before proceeding to the third objection to subscription, it would be as well to deal with an argument, arising from the debate over the confessional nature of the Articles, which is held by many to reduce subscription to a very minor matter. The pacific purpose of the Articles is noted, the title of which declares them to be "for the avoidance of diversities of opinions and for the establishing of consent touching true religion". But they have come to be regarded as "Articles of Peace" in a sense their title and function do not at all support. Ever since kindly and easygoing well-wishers tried to make it easy for the honest Chillingworth to subscribe in the seventeenth century, there has been a widespread notion that the Articles simply determine which doctrines shall not be spoken against by Anglican clergyman, for the sake of peace, whatever private views they may legitimately hold. This idea was thus current long before the Act of 1865, despite the fact that subscription was required *ex animo*. For example, John Bramhall writes as follows : "We do not suffer any man 'to reject' the 39 Articles 'at his pleasure' ; yet neither do we look upon them as essentials of saving faith or 'legacies of Christ and of His Apostles' ; but in a mean, as pious opinions fitted for the preservation of unity. Neither do we oblige any man to believe them, but only not to contradict them".¹⁴ The idea of Articles of Peace is built upon such statements as the last sentence here. It is uncertain that Bramhall himself held this view, however, because Bishop Burnet tells us that he is here referring to the assent of the laity, not the subscription of the clergy.¹⁵ For the laity, says Burnet, they are only Articles of

Communion, to enable them to determine whether they are sufficiently in sympathy to remain within the communion of the Church of England; but the subscription of the clergy implies more than this: the title of the Articles, the Fifth Canon, the Statute of Elizabeth "make it appear very plain, that the subscription of the clergy must be considered as a declaration of their own opinion, and not as a bare obligation to silence". Although Burnet went on to explain that the Royal Declaration of 1628 somewhat modified this conclusion, a statement which we shall have to investigate when we consider the interpretation of the Articles, it is so far true that the Articles lay down the confessional position, not only of the Church as a body, but also of each individual subscribing clergyman.

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We must, however, take as a final objection to the continuation of subscription that which denies the necessity of such a confession, even though it imposes no intolerable restriction upon the intellect, or unbearable handicap in ecumenical relations. It is suggested that a reunited Church will need no more than a united Church once had: namely, the Creeds; and moreover these creeds are, by nature, different from any particular confession. E. J. Bicknell elaborates upon this contention in his *Theological Introduction to the 39 Articles*.¹⁶ "While Creeds are a necessity, 'in a world where all expression of spirit is through body', Articles are a consequence 'not of the Church's existence but of the Church's failure . . . The one is a necessary feature of spiritual reality. The other is an unfortunate consequence of spiritual failure. . . .' Though both have been shaped by that discussion, which alone can sift out error and bring to light the truth yet in origin, value, and aim they differ. Creeds belong to the life of the Church and Articles to its life in a sinful world".

We must examine the points which Bicknell enumerates to see whether he makes good this distinction. First he claims that "in their essential nature Creeds grew up out of the positive statement of belief required of every Christian at his baptism," and thus unlike the later confessions they are not controversial statements designed to rule out error, although he admits that this was the case with "particular clauses". But he neglects to ask why such a statement was ever required at baptism; or why a statement of simple belief in Jesus Christ came to be lengthened into the creeds. The fact is that the creeds reflect the conflict with heresy throughout the first three centuries of the Christian era, and the "particular clauses" are simply those added in the controversies which come at the end of the period and are better known to us. Throughout this period the creeds were controversial statements of exactly the same type as later confessions, and in a measure they still are today. If they appear to us to be of a different "genus", the reason lies in the history of the medieval church, and the fact that they were written at a time when it was still possible to make a sufficient statement of faith brief enough for inclusion in public worship. This, and the benefit of liturgical antiquity, account for the fact that they remain today along with the Articles.

But the Articles themselves are, as Ryle reminded us, a proper part of our liturgy. Throughout the Church's history the tendency has always been towards a fuller statement of belief and a more careful exclusion of heresy, and this tendency appears in the formation of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds themselves and in the later production of the Athanasian Creed.

When this is realized the kinship of the Creeds with the later confessions will be obvious. Bicknell, however, has still to make his second point, namely, that "Creeds have behind them the authority of the universal and undivided Church . . . Hence, Creeds have a permanent value, Articles only a temporary value. We do not condemn, say, the Churches of the East, because they do not possess the 39 Articles. We should condemn a Church that rejected the Apostles' or Nicene Creed". In that case we shall, in fact, have to condemn the Churches of the East because they have never bothered to use the Apostles' Creed : as far as they are concerned it does not exist. The Athanasian Creed is not mentioned : this also has not been accepted in the East. Neither is there complete agreement even over the Nicene Creed. Therefore we dissent from Bicknell's conclusion that while there is no breach in catholicity when the Articles are discarded, "to reject the Creeds would be to part company with the life of the Universal Church". The Creeds are no test of catholicity, we have them because we are a branch of the Universal Church, but not vice versa. So we have the Apostles' and Athanasian Creeds because we are a branch of the Western Church, and the Eastern Churches do not have them because they are not branches of the Western Church. The question is one of genealogy, not catholicity.

Bicknell's final point is that the Articles are for the clergy, and "set a limit to official teaching", while "Creeds are for teachers and learners alike". It is true that only the clergy are required to subscribe to the Articles ; but that is not to say that they do not concern the laity. Clergy, members of Parliament, and other officials take an oath of allegiance to the Crown, but no one supposes that those not required to do so are exempt from such allegiance. We refuse to draw distinctions between the Creeds and the Articles from the deplorable fact that "a loyal churchman may go through his whole life without necessarily coming into contact with the 39 Articles". For the Creeds and the Articles are both results of what is a continuous duty of the Church on earth : to establish a standard of orthodoxy and give protection from error. The Reformation came at a time when it could no longer be said that the old creeds were proving adequate for this purpose. Thus the Reformation Confessions, published chiefly between 1530 and 1571 were both apologetic and disciplinary in their aims. "They set forward in the face of Christendom the various 'platforms' on which their systems were built. The Unreformed Church, since it also had become but a fragment of the Western Church, albeit in extent the largest, lay under the same compulsion. It, too, had to accept the necessity of Reformation."¹⁷ Thus the "Catholic" alternative to the Protestant Confessions is not the old Creeds. All agreed they were no longer sufficiently extensive. If we follow Newman; and, after an attempt to square the Articles with our own opinions, realize our interpretation is impossible¹⁸

and enter the Roman Church, we shall have to accept instead the Creed of Pius IV and the decrees of Trent as well as the ancient Creeds.

So far we have been defensive. We have considered one of the two possible courses before the Church today, that of doing away entirely with subscription to the Articles, and the reasons urged in its favour. We have seen, however, that subscription imposes no intellectual bondage more severe than that entailed in being a Christian, that of "bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ" (II Cor. x. 5), whose doctrine is contained in the Scriptures. G. K. Chesterton said that the purpose of opening the mind, as of opening the mouth, was to shut it again on something solid; and if we believe in the scriptural position of the Church of England, the Thirty-Nine Articles will be proper matter for our digestion. We have also seen that subscription will not tie us to what have become unrealistic divisions in the Church. And, thirdly, we have seen that subscription acknowledges a necessary development of the Church's declaration of the faith, the inclusion of those doctrines associated with the Protestant Reformation, and doctrines of which the Articles are an expression, as their inclusion in the *Harmony of Confessions* published at Geneva in 1581 serves to show. This *Harmony* was considered by Thomas Rogers, Bancroft's chaplain, who wrote the first commentary on the Articles in 1607, to prove that "not only in every particular state or kingdom, but also throughout Christendom where the Gospel is entertained, the primitive and apostolical days were again restored". To conclude this part of our argument let us quote the words of Bishop Henson, whose painful division of mind over the Articles is typical of the century concluding with the last war. One thing he was quite clear about: "Subscription is really indispensable, as well for the protection of the people, as for the security of the Church".¹⁹

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The objections to the Articles which have concerned us so far have been of a general kind which do not involve the actual contents of our confession. In turning to the second proposition, that the Articles be once more affirmed as adequate for their purpose, this will no longer be the case. For we now have to consider the various objections to this course of action on the grounds that the Articles are unsuitable and out of date, even if something of their kind is still necessary. This type of reasoning has been adopted somewhat more than frequently since Gore declared the Articles to be "a theological standard which has ceased to carry either serious obligation or theological enlightenment".²⁰ In fact, we might say that this is the typical twentieth century attitude to the Articles. In considering it we shall be positive, and, taking the various issues which confront the Church today, seek to discover whether the Articles are relevant to them. But since this will entail reference to the contents of the Articles a few words must first be said upon the notorious subject of their interpretation. From an early date in their history this has been an important matter because there have been people interested to put such a construction on the words as would enable them to subscribe.

We referred before to Burnet's judgment that subscription involves the opinions of those subscribing and is not a "bare obligation to silence". He goes on, however, to say that the Royal Declaration of 1628, drawn up by Laud, permits greater liberty. By insisting on the literal and grammatical sense it opened the way for casuistry and invited the ingenuities of Sancta Clara and Newman. Burnet cites the title of the Third Article as literally capable of at least three senses. This unfortunate official ruling (for such it was, strictly speaking, although it was published on the king's authority alone) made it possible to forget the intentions of the Reformers: "Only by isolating the 39 Articles from the historical situation in which they were framed, and from the documents with which they were historically associated, and by disallowing the *contemporanea expositio* of their language, could so gross a paradox have been seriously maintained even by the polemical ardour of ecclesiastical partisanship".²¹ Even before Burnet grasped the significance of the Declaration, another writer, Peter Heylin, had sought to direct interpreters back to the right attitude of mind by emphasizing that the meaning of the Articles where doubtful was to be determined by reference to the doctrine of the Reformers.²² But Newman felt himself to be under no such obligation. "We have no duties towards their framers"—but, "a duty which we owe both to the Catholic Church and to our own, to take the reformed confessions in the most Catholic sense they will admit".²³ What is this "Catholic sense"? Newman uses a similar phrase many times. Thus he writes with reference to the Articles: "The only peculiarity of the view I advocate, if I must so call it, is this—that whereas it is usual at this day to make the particular belief of their writers their true interpretation, I would make the belief of the Catholic Church such".²⁴ Or again, admitting this time that he is no plain expositor: "We do not know yet what the English Church will bear of infused Catholic truth".²⁵ He also speaks of "Catholic principle" and "Catholic tradition". And we might add that such phrases have become not uncommon among churchmen today.

But what do they mean? This is the problem of interpretation of the Articles as it really bears on the present situation. Our interpretation, we are told, must be harmonious with the traditional belief of the Catholic Church. But in any conflict over the precise content of the "Catholic" tradition, who is to decide? *Ex hypothesi* no national authority will suffice, and apart from the Church of Rome there is no other. At present there is no possibility of referring the problem to a General Council. Bishop Henson states precisely the answer to all such talk: "The fact is that an unformulated tradition can never provide a basis for ecclesiastical discipline".²⁶ It is sometimes said that the Articles have failed in their declared purpose of internal unity: it is rather this "unformulated tradition", which men have followed instead of the Articles, that has failed. In order for them to achieve their purpose they must be understood in a Protestant sense, because "their intention, their spirit, and their language are unquestionably Protestant".²⁷

We can begin our examination of current issues in the Church by observing the relevance of the Articles to the Anglo-Catholic movement. This has always been appreciated, ever since Tract XC, and has, of course, largely to do with interpretation. But, as we have just seen, this relationship is now not so narrow as formerly, but has come to apply to the whole idea of following "Catholic tradition". There is also one other modern issue which we have already dealt with: the Articles can claim to have an important function, as yet wholly unappreciated, in the task our Church has set itself of achieving closer understanding with and between the other Churches. What other burning questions occupy the mind of Churchmen today? We propose to take the following subjects as being those of major importance: the future of the Anglican Communion, the demand for liturgical revision, the current Anglican emphasis on the Incarnation, the return of a biblical theology, and the relationship between Church and State. Is it true that the Articles are so irrelevant to all of these questions that it is impossible to charge with significance an act of subscription to a code fully occupied with long-forgotten, sixteenth-century points?

Let us look then at the direction in which the Anglican Communion is tending. It is plainly a road of centralization and standardization. We now have our first officer of the Anglican Communion; the Lambeth Conferences become increasingly important; and at the latest Conference, it was hoped "that it is now possible to work towards a liturgy which will win its way throughout the Anglican Communion".²⁸ In all this the Articles are as usual left out of the picture as sure to be irrelevant. Liturgical unity may be desired, but it is not thought wise to concern the Anglican Church overseas with the Articles.²⁹ It is the familiar notion of "the Catholic faith" rather than the Anglican confession which is made the point of doctrinal unity. The 1930 Conference affirmed that the churches of the Anglican communion are a company, "whose faith has been grounded in the doctrines . . . for which the Church of England has always stood"; but these are then described in the the following manner: "the Catholic faith in its entirety: that is to say, the truth of Christ, contained in Holy Scripture; stated in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds; expressed in the Sacraments of the Gospel and rites of the Primitive Church as set forth in the Book of Common Prayer with its various local adaptations; and safeguarded by the historic threefold order of the Ministry".³⁰ It would be difficult to insist on the Articles because most other churches in the Communion have abolished clerical subscription, and some no longer print the code in their Prayer Book; yet it ought to be done because of their significance for the Church of England.

But, whether this happens or not, the point we are now making is that the Articles are in themselves of extreme relevance for the whole communion. What more valuable than a reminder of the truths of Article XX at each Lambeth conference? Again, along with the increasing standardization and desire for a uniform liturgy, we place the pertinent words of Article XXXIV: "It is not necessary that Traditions and Ceremonies be in all places one, and utterly alike; for at all times they have been divers, and may be changed according to the diversities of countries, times, and men's manners, so that nothing be

ordained again God's Word ". In the third place, we still have the example of the Roman Church as a warning against excessive standardization. The successful achievement of a common liturgy in the Anglican communion could lead to more obnoxious developments against which Article XXIV is designed to safeguard us. Hardly, then, can we pretend that the Articles have nothing to say about this situation which confronts our Church.

Some of the points in the Articles we have just been referring to apply also to the proposals for liturgical revision. The man who upholds the Articles will not be a die-hard obscurantist on this question because he knows well that " Traditions and Ceremonies . . . may be changed " and that the Church " hath power to decree Rites or Ceremonies ". But he also knows that " it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God's Word written ". By disobeying this we are in danger of producing a liturgy hopelessly at variance with the Articles and the scriptural principles they lay down. The disastrous consequences of this are often concealed by talk of an imagined antipathy between the Articles and the existing Prayer Book.

As an example of revision proceeding in a direction ruled out by the Articles let us take the doctrine of Eucharistic Sacrifice which is sure to be pressed for inclusion in any future order for the Holy Communion. In its modern form, the doctrine may still readily be shown to be unscriptural. The delusion rests upon a confusion of priesthoods, that of Christ and that of all believers, which are quite clearly two completely separate ideas in the New Testament. Yet in the following quotation from the 1958 Lambeth report the two are patently confused : " We offer our praise and thanksgiving for Christ's sacrifice for us and so present it again, and ourselves in Him, before the Father . . . We ourselves, incorporate in the mystical body of Christ, are the sacrifice we offer. Christ with us offers us in Himself to God ".³¹ Again the doctrine is often expressed as that of " the whole Church offering the whole Christ ". Such a doctrine cannot properly appear in the worship of a Church whose confession is the Thirty-Nine Articles. Not only is anything contrary to Scripture condemned, but the whole modern emphasis in the Eucharist of man approaching God is explicitly contradicted by Article XXV. Once again the Articles speak, and speak loudly, to our present situation, and on grounds which cannot be said to belong solely to the sixteenth century.

By now our method of argument will be plain, and a brief examination of how it applies to the remaining issues will be sufficient. In his book *From Gore to Temple*, the Archbishop of Canterbury describes the current emphasis of Anglican theology upon the Incarnation. He admits that this is not a scriptural emphasis. But, of course, it blends well with modern notions of the Eucharist. There is nothing in the Creeds to show us anything different unless it be indirectly in practice through the incongruity striking us of rising to our feet at the words " . . . and was crucified ". Here we have a modern reason for a more explicit statement of the faith than the Creeds contain. The central importance of the cross in the Gospels is reflected in the Articles, and the fulness of its doctrine presented through various individual Articles. There we have the ideas of reconciliation (II), sacrifice (II, XV),

merit (XI), redemption (XXVIII, XXXI), propitiation (XXXI), satisfaction (XXXI). These statements ensure the constant "cruciality" of the cross. Likewise, the return to a truly biblical theology is commended by the Articles, even in some of its detailed characteristics; such as the importance of Old Testament studies (VII). Other points made are the sufficiency of Scripture (VI); the limits imposed by Scripture upon theological speculation (XVII); the submission of the Church to Scripture (XX)—all of which can guide the development of theological thought from its present stage.

A final issue, and one which is coming very much to the fore at the moment, concerns the relationship between Church and State. Here, perhaps more than anywhere, the Articles, with their reference to "every particular or national church", are considered to be dated by sixteenth century modes of thought. But again the idea of the "Catholic Church", is liable to obscure the equally scriptural identity of the local church, so that the Articles legitimately speak of the "Church of Jerusalem" and the "Church of Rome". Now it would certainly be intolerable for the Catholic Church to be in bondage to the powers of this world, but we must appreciate the problems which confront fragments of that universal community. For the individual believer, for example, there is the clear scriptural duty of obedience to temporal authority and subjection to its discipline (see Article XXXVII). Likewise, what is the local church to do when the government of that place desires to recognize the Christian faith? Should it withdraw as a Holy clique from the rest of the nation? "A National Church should mean a Church which exists to purify and elevate the mind of a nation; to give those who make and administer and obey its laws a sense of the grandeur of law and of the source whence it proceeds, to tell the rulers of the nation, and all the members of the nation that all false ways are ruinous ways, that truth is the only stability of our time or of any time" (F. D. Maurice).³² So long as our Church is called to perform such a prophetic function, it will be sheer escapism to seek liberty from its duty to the State. The initiative in disestablishment must always come from the State. Until such initiative is taken, Article XXXVII will be relevant. A statement such as: "The laws of the Realm may punish Christian men with death, for heinous and grievous offences" may seem unnecessary today; but, together with the declaration that rulers should "restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evildoers" of all estates and degrees, "whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal", it puts a welcome end to a chapter in the quarrel between Church and State which had already wasted more than enough time and energy.

* * * *

We are now in a position to put some conclusion to our argument. We have seen in the first place that subscription to a code of belief is still necessary. It is designed to guarantee both the orthodoxy of the clergy and the protection of the laity.³³ Moreover, we have seen that there is no justification for abolishing subscription to a specifically Anglican confessional position. We then proceeded to investigate whether that confession is adequate for modern use. We say adequate

because we do not wish to suggest that no revision could possibly improve upon the present version. Surely we have seen that no creed is ever final. But revision was ruled out at the beginning as an impracticable course of action at a time of considerable theological disagreement within the Church of England. With a smile we remember Erasmus's words about the multiplying of confessions until there were "well nigh as many faiths as there were men", when we find C. B. Moss coming into print with his own private revision of the Articles.³⁴ In passing we may note that he considers the Blessed Virgin, the Anglican Communion, the Roman See, and Ordination to be the points on which the Articles need supplementing for the twentieth century; while the Articles on self-righteousness (XIII), the sovereignty of God (XVII), faithless communicants (XXIX), and the Homilies (XXXV) are no longer relevant, although it is not explained why this is so. Disregarding revision, then, as a possible course of action, we took the Articles as they stand and found them by no means irrelevant to the present time. On every major issue they produce relevant principles for Anglicans, because Anglicanism is a Reformed faith. The words of Bishop Henson express the conclusion we have reached: "I think that in the future, as in the past, Anglicanism must justify itself on the principles of the Reformation. I believe that the religious crisis of our time" (and Henson had in mind very much the issues which we have been discussing—Angio-Catholicism, Establishment, Reunion) "can only be handed successfully in the spirit, at once conservative and courageous, which led the English Reformers to bring the established medieval system of faith, worship, and discipline to the test of the New Testament".³⁵ That is the fundamental reason why the Articles are relevant today, and for that matter will always be relevant, because they contain the principles of the Reformation. To uphold them and to believe in them is therefore to be truly Anglican. This is no mere party issue. F. D. Maurice could say: "I look upon them (the Articles) as an invaluable character, protecting us against a system that once enslaved us and might enslave us again; protecting us also against the systems of the present day—against 'Records' and 'Times' newspapers, and Bishops of Exeter, and Heads of Houses".

So then, instead of abandoning the Articles and trying to pretend they do not exist, let us do what has been the practice in the past at times of theological division: let us reassert the adequacy of the Articles and subscription, as it was asserted in the Declaration of 1628 and in the Royal Circular of 1721. The Revised Canon 2 will give us our starting point: "The 39 Articles are agreeable to the Word of God and may be assented to with a good conscience by all members of the Church of England". But much more is required than this. Let us not only assent to the Articles, but use them, to provide that dynamic which shall save us from "a doctrinal incoherence which has no parallel in any other church claiming to be traditionally orthodox".³⁶

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Book Reviews

THE YOUNG MR. WESLEY.

By V. H. H. Green. (Edward Arnold.) 342 pp. 35s.

Books dealing with the life and work of John Wesley are sufficiently numerous to cast doubt on the necessity of a new one. But Dr. Green here gives us something on a period of Wesley's life which it becomes clear is not as fully covered as might be by Tyerman, Telford, and the rest. For one thing, the author has been given access to documents in Lincoln College, Oxford, and to Wesley's diaries for the years 1725 to 1734. For another, as might be expected from the author of *Oxford Common Room*, he gives a fascinating account of Oxford life during the early eighteenth century, describing its political and religious trends, together with its academic shortcomings and achievements.

Not least of the interest of this work lies in its further survey of the Epworth background, from which emerges with even greater emphasis the significance of Susanna Wesley as mother and rector's wife. Criticism of Wesley is perhaps a little severe; in particular, that his emotional attitude towards women prevented spiritual harmony. But it would be true to say, as the writer also states, that Wesley was not a profound or creative thinker, for his theology was neither perfectly consistent, nor developed as a coherent system. Three writers exercised a decisive influence upon his character: Thomas à Kempis, Jeremy Taylor, and William Law; to them he repeatedly acknowledged his debt, and his mystical experience owed much to each. The foundation and progress of the Holy Club are traced in the light of Wesley's introspective nature, and of the irreligious atmosphere of contemporary Oxford. In an appendix, the author brings together a surprising list of books which Wesley had studied between 1725 and 1734, including classical literature, plays, and history, as well as numerous religious works, indicating the breadth of his reading, even if much of his interest in these works was only superficial.

Yet one of the main impressions left by this book is the depth of Oxford's influence on Wesley throughout his life. He could seldom return to Oxford without a feeling of nostalgia. There were times in later years when he even wished that he were still a fellow of Lincoln, while he certainly retained many of the practices begun in his Oxford days, such as regular devotion and Bible-reading. His cast of mind was always academic, and personally and spiritually his indebtedness to Oxford was of the utmost significance to his subsequent career.

The picture of the university is sketched by a master hand, and those who only know Wesley's life story after 1738 should look to the quarry whence emerged the great evangelist, and in doing so they will find in this book much to give them greater knowledge and understanding of his complex personality.

G. C. B. DAVIES.

THE PROTESTANT MIND OF THE ENGLISH REFORMATION : 1570-1640.

By Charles H. George and Katherine George. (Princeton University Press. London : Oxford University Press.) 452 pp. 68s.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of this comprehensive study. The wedded authors have steeped themselves in the literature of the period to which their book is devoted, and have distilled its mentality in what must now take its merited place as a standard work. One is tempted to embark on a higher critical examination of the composite authorship of the volume, for, truth to tell, it gets away to a somewhat halting start, perpetrating a number of questionable generalizations and verbal infelicities ; but before long it gets into gear and proceeds with a smoothness that goes well with the absorbing interest of its subject-matter.

The Protestant concept of wealth and of " calling " are expounded in a manner that should illuminate many whose minds have been clouded with prejudices. It is shown that the spirit of capitalism " simply does not exist in England before 1640 ", and that " it is impossible to argue that Protestantism in any way encouraged a profit system when the massive, uniform bulk of sermon and tractate literature equated any desire for profit (as opposed to service) with covetousness ".

The concept of Church and State is summed up by the dictum of Archbishop Sandys that " when the word and the sword do join, then is the people well ruled, and then is God well served ". It is, moreover, a concept free from Erastianism, as, for example, Article XXXVII clearly testifies. As for the Church, abhorrence of priestcraft and emphasis on the spiritual status and responsibility of the laity brought clergy and laity close together. At the same time, the extraordinary nature of the minister's calling was not underestimated. The high value set upon preaching—and in particular preaching that was plain, systematic, and scriptural—helped to mould a theologically intelligent laity.

The authors remind us of the important fact that among the English divines of this period there is an " absolutely universal acceptance of Scripture as the Word of God over any and all merely human authority or tradition ", and that this holds good also for Archbishop Laud, who " affirms, as any ' puritan ' might have done, that the Church of England is founded decisively and narrowly in Scripture ". There was, likewise, an essential unanimity in sacramental doctrine. The assertion of Richard Hooker that " the real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not to be sought for in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament ", and of Archbishop Ussher that " there comes no danger from the want of the sacraments, but only from the contempt of them ", are typical, as is also the insistence that the sacraments are not bare signs but efficacious seals of the covenant of grace. Indeed, one of the most significant conclusions to which the evidence amassed in this book points is that it is " absolutely clear that the nature of the division between an Anglican and a

'puritan' party within the Church of England was then [in 1604, at the Hampton Court conference], as it had always been, not doctrinal, but almost entirely ecclesiastical or institutional".

There is, further, a thorough understanding of the Protestant mind in its reaction against and repudiation of Roman Catholic errors. The sin of schism adheres, not to Protestantism, but "to the church which was in error, and, being told of error, still continued in it". The Reformation, furthermore, was essentially the reaffirmation of the old faith once delivered to the saints. If there were innovations, they were the false doctrines and practices of the Papal Church, not the tenets of the Reformers. As Lancelot Andrewes, Bishop of Winchester, said: "*Renovatores modo sumus, non Novatores*". The *via media* of the Church of England is the middle road which shuns the monolithic obduracy of Romanism on the one hand and the sectarian irresponsibility of Anabaptism on the other. And this is the road of Calvin no less than of Cranmer and Hooker. Thus our authors say that "between Roman Catholicism and Anabaptism, two chasms of profound error on the right and left, extends the wide and relatively level plateau of valid Protestantism"; and the avoidance of "the ultimately divisive policy of absolute conformity" is, they conclude, "perhaps more than all else the central substance of the *via media*". This middle course is incompatible with the "Laudian canon" which "commands for all what had hitherto been left to each particular minister's decision". It was shattered by the enforcement of uniformity in 1662, in consequence of which so many hundreds of her best clergy were driven from the Church of England. This should be a recollection both sobering and salutary as we are about to enter the year 1962 in an expectant atmosphere of ecclesiastical co-operation and Christian reunion.

PHILIP E. HUGHES.

THE SEMANTICS OF BIBLICAL LANGUAGE.

By James Barr. (Oxford University Press.) 313 pp. 37s. 6d.

In recent years, Professor Barr tells us, he has come to believe that one of the greatest dangers to sound and adequate interpretation of the Bible "comes from the prevailing use of procedures which, while claiming to rest upon a knowledge of the Israelite and Greek ways of thinking, constantly mishandle and distort the linguistic evidence of the Hebrew and Greek languages as they are used in the Bible". One outcome of this conviction is the writing of this unusually important and timely book. It is a cogent scientific critique of a mode of theologizing which has become almost obligatory for those who wish to be accepted in the more *élite* academic circles. Briefly, what Dr. Barr attacks is the assumption (treated as a *datum*) that the Hebrew way of thinking is dynamic and concrete, whereas the Greek way of thinking is static and abstract, and that this fundamental difference may be discovered and expounded from the very words of the two languages. Thus single terms are taken by the advocates of this method and so loaded with intricate theological significances by appealing to their etymologies that they are described as in themselves remarkable and even untranslatable. What it amounts to, in fact, is a modern

(though not really very new) form of gnosticism—an inner, esoteric knowledge possessed by the few experts and communicated by them to their pupils. It is strongly reminiscent, for example, of the pretensions of the Christian cabbalists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries who spurned the common meaning of a word and by their techniques produced from its “core” a whole system of theology.

Professor Barr charges his academic contemporaries with ignorance of genuine linguistic semantics, with making assumptions that are absurd, perverse, and comic, and with “arranging the material in a way which is certain to produce the predicted result”. He very rightly maintains that “etymology is not, and does not profess to be, a guide to the semantic value of words in their current usage”, and that “such value has to be determined from the current usage and not from the derivation”; for the etymology of a word is “not a statement about its meaning but about its history”. He does not hesitate to assert that if the arguments used by this now fashionable school of interpretation “have any validity at all, you can make the Scriptures mean anything you like at all”. This, we may add, was certainly true of the lucubrations of theosophists, scholastics, and cabbalists in the past.

Among the theological luminaries who are smitten by the sword of Dr. Barr's censure, Professor T. F. Torrance, whose colleague in the University of Edinburgh he was until recently, is frequently assailed. Dr. Karl Barth fails to emerge unscathed, and Kittel's immensely influential Theological Word Book of the New Testament is virtually cut down at the roots. It is not necessarily their *theology* of which he complains, but the fact that “what may be a good theological case is spoiled by bad linguistic argument, and is not supported by actual exegetical argument from texts which *say* things from which the general thesis could be supported”. The meaning of a text is to be sought not from the words of that text in isolation from each other, but from the words in combination. Both in interpretation and in translation it is *the sentence*—words which are in syntactical association with each other—that is of semantic significance. Accordingly Professor Barr insists that the connection between biblical language and theology “must be made in the first place at the level of the larger linguistic complexes such as the sentences”. The new “orthodoxy”, scorning as it does the old orthodoxy with its classical doctrine of Scripture and “propositional” theology, has had to invent its own form of biblicism, and in doing so has substituted a theology of event, a doctrine of “concept history”, and indeed proof-words in the place of proof-texts. Well may Dr. Barr ask whether we are making progress! His book will do much to lead theological scholarship back to methods that are saner and more appropriate than is often the case at present.

PHILIP E. HUGHES.

THE PRE-CONQUEST CHURCH IN ENGLAND.

By Margaret Deanesly. (A. and C. Black.) 374 pp. 38s.

The history of the conversion of England and the growth of the Church in the period of the Roman occupation, the Saxon invasions,

the development of the English kingdoms, the Danish raids, and the last years before the Norman conquest, is little known to most present-day Christians in this country. Few of the regular text-books of English Church History devote much space to it, and except for the names of a few outstanding personalities such as Augustine, Bede and Dunstan, the period remains in the obscurity of the Dark Ages. Professor Deanesly's admirable volume in a new "Ecclesiastical History of England" edited by Mr. J. C. Dickinson is most welcome, both as filling a notable gap in the library of most students and as an excellent piece of work in itself.

The author modestly speaks of her "insufficient knowledge" for the task of dealing with so large a subject; but she writes with great erudition, which is rarely allowed to obtrude itself into a smoothly-flowing narrative, imaginative power which creates a vivid picture of Church life in different periods, and a deep insight into the realities of religion. This is book from which all but the most learned specialist in the history of Roman and Anglo-Saxon Britain will learn a great deal, and it throws much light on the obscure history of Celtic Christianity and its relations with the mission of Augustine. Professor Deanesly gives a coherent account of the complex story of the planting of Christianity in different parts of Britain, describing in a lively narrative how the mission, under its various leaders, was organized so as to convert the country "from the top downwards" by establishing the Church in the tribal centres under the protection of the local civil chiefs. Some instructive comparisons could be made here with the radically different policy of the modern missionary movements. It would be useful, too, to analyse, more fully than is possible in such a volume, what aspects of the gospel exerted the most compelling attraction for the pagan English. Certainly, the association of miracles with the truth of the preaching is strongly brought out, the former being commonly regarded as the criterion of the latter.

Besides giving a very full and well documented account of the major personalities and events, the author illuminates many interesting by-ways, such as the part played in the history of Welsh Christianity by the family and associates of the emperor Maximus. She devotes much space to general descriptions of Church life, giving us an excellent picture of its administration, the development of parochial organization after the period when the Church operated from regional centres staffed by the bishop and his *familia*, and when local churches were few, the nature of the Church's worship, and its art and architecture. All this is excellent, but occasionally there are over-long digressions, such as that in which Professor Deanesly surveys the history of the Gelasian Sacramentary and other Roman service books.

The book is sometimes repetitive, and the reader may occasionally suspect that each chapter was composed as a separate unit. Technical terms are adequately explained, but sometimes the explanation is not given when the term first appears, so that the reader is mystified for a time. Occasionally more explanation is needed. Thus it would be useful to be given the evidence for the assertion that the feast of the Exaltation commemorated the vision of Constantine as well as the restoration of the Cross to Jerusalem after its recapture by Heraclius.

There is an excellent index and tables of the archbishops, but at least one good map, and preferably more than one, is sorely needed by all whose geographical knowledge is not encyclopedic. Few will be able to follow Professor Deanesly confidently without a detailed map in her peregrinations to Brixworth, Breedon-on-the-Hill, Bewcastle, and Elmham; and the difficulty is increased when the channel between Thanet and the mainland is spelt with a capital C.

G. W. H. LAMPE.

THE PRIESTHOOD OF ALL BELIEVERS.

By Cyril Eastwood. (Epworth.) 268 pp. 30s.

The doctrine that God's covenant people are a royal priesthood is fundamental to New Testament Christianity, and the recovery of a true understanding of its implications is probably the most important task for the Church today. There are many welcome signs that in most of the main denominations the liberation of the Church, in theory and in practice (pastoral, evangelistic, and liturgical), from a false clericalism is beginning to make headway.

Mr. Eastwood has a firm grasp of the principles of a sound doctrine of the Church. "The priesthood of believers is the natural corollary of the believers' relationship to God; it is expressed in the corporate worship and witness of the Church; and far from being anti-ministerial, it sets the ministerial priesthood within the context of the universal priesthood. The Church is not a collection of individuals claiming their rights, but a kingdom of priests—a united spiritual society exercising in various ways that priesthood which is common to all believers." "The ministry of the Church is the continuation of Christ's own ministry through the whole membership of the Church . . . exercised by all those ordained to the care of souls . . . and by all members in their worship and service."

These are vitally important truths, which point to a much fuller and more positive conception of the universal priesthood than has often been held by those for whom "the priesthood of the laity", sometimes expressed in the performance by laymen of the peculiar functions of the ordained minister, has had a mainly negative significance. The doctrine of justification by faith, it is true, does deny sacerdotalism in the narrow sense; but it is not enough to hold that every individual has free access to God. We must go on to claim the positive duty and privilege of every member of Christ's people to share in the task of bringing his priesthood to bear upon the world through service and intercession.

Mr. Eastwood's study is mainly historical, and does not devote as much space as we could wish to the present-day implications of the doctrine. Much more needs to be said about the meaning of vocation, and, while the liturgical expression of the universal priesthood is important, there are many more vital matters to be discussed than the revival of the kiss of peace and the theologically somewhat dubious emphasis on the offertory in the Holy Communion.

As a survey of the history of the doctrine this book is useful, but it suffers from some defects. So little is said about the biblical basis that

it might almost appear as though this truth originated with Luther ; and so much space is given to an extended panegyric of Wesley and Methodism as to suggest that only in that tradition is it truly believed and practised. The author relies far too much on secondary sources. This leads him into absurdities. Thus, the "Catholic" doctrine of eucharistic sacrifice is illustrated by incomplete quotations from Anglican divines (including Ridley !) as cited by an Anglo-Catholic controversialist. The secondary authority is sometimes mistaken for the original, so that we are told that Cranmer "even asserts that 'at a pinch the ceremony of consecration is unnecessary'" ; and a reference to the *Dictionary of Christian Biography* culled at second hand from Gore gives rise to an odd confusion which includes, to judge from the index, reading the abbreviation "s.v." as though it were a person's initials.

These small errors are symptomatic of some superficiality and carelessness in the author's writing of history. He is especially weak in his treatment of Anglicanism, beginning with a curious attempt to trace the doctrine of the Reformers to "the reforms envisaged in the Act of Supremacy (1536)". The very little that is said about the Fathers, too, particularly Tertullian and Cyprian, is somewhat misleading. Further, however unsatisfactory they may be from a Protestant standpoint, the recent endeavours of Roman Catholic theologians to grapple with the problem of the place and mission of the laity deserve at least some mention.

G. W. H. LAMPE.

COUNSEL AND CONSENT : ASPECTS OF CHURCH GOVERNMENT.

By Eric Waldram Kemp. (S.P.C.K.) 244 pp. 27s. 6d.

This book contains the 1960 Bampton Lectures delivered by Canon E. W. Kemp, being "Aspects of the Government of the Church as exemplified in the history of the English Provincial Synods". The first seven lectures are thus essentially historical, whilst the eighth (and I imagine most studied) is contemporary and certainly controversial. This final lecture is of such importance that a reviewer might be excused for limiting his remarks to this "Parliament, Laity and Provinces" chapter without disparaging the intensive work that must have gone into the other most interesting lectures, which indeed form an integral part in the pattern and conclusions of the series.

Canon Kemp is greatly concerned with "the stranglehold upon the life of the Church possessed by the House of Commons in virtue of two things, the Act of Submission of the Clergy, and the Act of Uniformity to which the Prayer Book is attached". He then illustrates the extent of this "stranglehold" by listing extracts from twelve canons that will require statutory legislation and will therefore come before Parliament, suggesting that this control is now an anachronism. He maintains that the system is wrong in principle, gives undue power to minorities, and induces a kind of paralysis in church life (these last are strong words). From one who states and reiterates that he has become convinced that "the parliamentary control prevents much that would be valuable and widely welcomed in the Church from ever reaching the stage of definite legislative proposals, that it produces a

sense of frustration which impedes the work of the Church", and who asserts that "already certain persons have undertaken intensive propaganda among members of Parliament with the aim of securing the rejection of some of the measures necessary to prepare the way for the revised canons", it comes as something of an anti-climax to read in a footnote that the author's intention in this book is not to advocate disestablishment. At the same time Canon Kemp contends that the Church of England should seek to obtain that measure of self-government that the Church of Scotland enjoys. He is not the first, of course, to look with envy at the Scottish Establishment, and in this book he prints the Scottish Declaratory Articles together with our draft canons A1-6, maintaining that it is very probable that an agreed statement such as is represented by the Scottish Articles could be obtained in the Church of England today with little difficulty. But would our Church in that respect affirm definite loyalty to the Reformation in the manner of the Scottish Church which specifically states that it "adheres to the Scottish Reformation"?

If, however, Canon Kemp believes that both Church and States benefit by establishment (as he says) then he must be prepared to accept its seeming restrictions (realizing that for some they are safeguards) as well as its advantages. Indeed, one may perhaps feel greater sympathy towards those who openly advocate disestablishment (whilst opposing them) than towards those who assert that establishment is impeding the Church's work, yet are prepared to retain it. Is any church more free to preach the Word of God than the Church of England? *That* surely is the acid test. But it rankles in the minds of Canon Kemp and those who think with him, because the Convocations have, for instance, had some regard to Parliament's possible reaction to the marriage and confession canons. The reference to intensive propaganda amongst M.P.s (of which Canon Kemp evidently has first-hand information) is a reminder that 1928 still jars, and that after thirty years. About the Prayer Book rejection Canon Kemp says of Parliament that it claimed to have "a better right . . . to speak on behalf of the laity of the Church of England". No one, however, can gainsay that it was a constitutional right (whether or not it was better) and indeed a right deliberately endorsed on the Church's behalf when the Enabling Act was passed. No wonder it looks now as though the contribution of positive forward-looking and theologically-minded evangelicals is likely to be increasingly felt in the Church.

When Canon Kemp turns to the question of Synodical Government he reasserts the authority with which he handles a subject. If there is to be some form of such government, Canon Kemp rightly and sensibly stresses the many difficulties and intricacies of joining the laity with the clergy, for nothing is to be gained by glossing over these problems. "The laity must be willing for the clergy to consider certain matters on certain stages of business alone" is a contention that some of the laity will probably not support, but which I believe to be quite justified at present. The recommendation of the 1958 Synodical Government Report, continues Canon Kemp, should be put into operation, joining the House of Laity with the Convocations

to sit as a General Synod ; but with measures involving doctrine and liturgy, and probably with most of the canons, the present Convocations should be empowered to discuss provincially and apart from the laity at a second stage of the proceedings. Canon Kemp admits that the plan sounds complicated (his reference to consultation at diocesan level on all fundamental questions may well be impracticable), but he rightly observes that any such scheme will inevitably be so, though a good deal less time-wasting than the present procedure over the canons.

The expected further debates in the Convocations on Synodical Government early in 1962 (the whole question having been referred to them by the Church Assembly) will be awaited with all the more interest and understanding after reading Canon Kemp's lectures.

MALCOLM McQUEEN.

SIX HUNDRED NEW CHURCHES : THE CHURCH BUILDING COMMISSION 1818-1856.

By M. H. Port. (S.P.C.K.) 130 pp. with Appendices. 50s.

When Mr. Port allows the story to move forward through the medium of the many and varied characters who play their part in it the pages of this book glow. When he writes more prosaically this "Study of the Church Building Commission 1818-1856" makes somewhat dull reading. Fortunately most of this industrious work on an interesting subject firmly holds the reader's attention. How many today realize that throughout the country stand some six hundred Grecian and Gothic style churches erected by this independent commission with the aid of £1,500,000 in government grants? How many know anything of the private enterprise and zeal that went into the years of this project resulting in the provision of accommodation for some half-million worshippers?

A glance at the first Appendix reveals how prolific were the grants made by the Commission. Of course churchmanship affected their regulations : "High Churchmen and Evangelicals alike believed in the need to ensure that the minister could be heard throughout the church, whether praying or preaching ; but it was the High Churchmen who directed the Commission who ensured that due significance was given to the altar." All the more impressive, therefore (in the case of London), is the list of the evangelical Islington churches, not to mention Donaldson's Holy Trinity, Brompton, Vulliamy's St. James-the-Less, Bethnal Green, and Nash's famed All Souls', Langham Place ("The spire, I submit, is the most beautiful of forms, is peculiarly calculated for the termination of a vista, and particularly appropriate to a church," wrote its creator).

The account of the Commission's organization and methods, its relationship towards the government and the public, and to the architectural and building professions reveals that the problems that seem specially vexatious today no less had their counterpart a century and more ago. A Commissioner's lament in 1819 that "we meet and meet again with the same difficulty and waste a vast amount of time without making any advance in the work" is not necessarily peculiar to committee work of that time. Or again in 1824 the Commission's

surveyor criticized the slow progress of building and irregular construction, whilst a year later the 10 per cent excess in the tenders on what the architect had estimated, due to an increase in the price of materials and labour, has an all too familiar modern ring.

If it seems strange that the Prime Minister of the day in moving the second reading of the Bill to give effect to the parliamentary grant and the setting up of the Commission called it "the most important measure he had ever submitted to their Lordships' consideration" there can be no doubt that the effect of the Commission's work for forty years (latterly on a decreasing scale until merging finally with the Ecclesiastical Commissioners) had a vital impact in literally bringing "the Church" to the masses. One closes this book saluting the endeavours and labours of those clergy and laity who devoted time and talent to the Lord's work in this necessitous sphere.

This book was produced with the aid of a grant from a fund and is published for the Church Historical Society. It is a pity that it has had to be priced at 50s., so putting it beyond the range of many who might otherwise purchase it. One might too, have expected better plates and quality of paper for this price—and certainly the absence of an erratum slip.

MALCOLM McQUEEN.

THE SECOND PERIOD OF QUAKERISM.

By W. C. Braithwaite. (Cambridge University Press.) 734 pp. 30s.

"The Quakers have the best records of any nonconformist body, and they also have the best modern account of their history in W. C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, 1912, and *The Second Period of Quakerism*, 1919," writes Sir George Clarke in his volume in the Oxford History of England. A reading of this later volume very much confirms Sir George Clark's verdict. W. C. Braithwaite was a lawyer and a banker—he was also a first-class historian who knew how to marshal and interpret facts and then put them into a readable history. *The Beginnings of Quakerism* was republished in 1955 with notes by H. J. Cadbury. This second volume also has notes by H. J. Cadbury; Professor F. B. Tolles has written an interesting introduction.

Book I of the present volume tells the story of the Quakers from the Restoration to the death of William Penn in 1718. Book II is entitled "The Period of Expression" and tells of the internal character and doctrinal position of the movement, dealing with such matters as church government, the formulation of faith, and Quaker colonization. Book III examines the position and character of the movement at the end of the seventeenth century.

The earliest chapters tell the grim story of persecution under Charles II. Quakers were imprisoned because of their refusal to take the oath of allegiance. Swearing was allowed by the Law but, they maintained, Christ forbade it with the words "Swear not at all". The Christians could no more go back on Christ's command than go back from the Gospel to the Law. As Braithwaite says, the demand to take oaths

was for the Quaker similar to the demand to burn incense before the Emperor's image for the early Christian.

The leader to whom most attention is given is not George Fox but William Penn. It is fascinating to follow the story of Penn, son of an admiral, and the lifelong friend of James, Duke of York, later James II. To this friendship the Quakers owed the colony of Pennsylvania granted them in 1681. Penn's friendship with James up to the time of his abdication earned him accusations of being a secret papist.

The chapter on "The Formulation of Faith", is one of the most rewarding. Here the author shows how early Quakers like Isaac Pennington and Robert Barclay allowed their subjective experience of Christ in the heart to overshadow the importance of the great objective facts of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Here and throughout the book W. C. Braithwaite foreshadows the conclusions of subsequent historians of Puritanism like Geoffrey Nuttall, who have shown that Quakerism is the logical left-wing of Puritanism. Puritanism started with the watchword "*sola scriptura*": it ended with a movement which put the experience of the Spirit first and the Scriptures second.

MICHAEL HENNEL.

THE UNCHANGING COMMISSION: A RE-APPRAISAL OF FOREIGN MISSIONS AND THE CHRISTIAN'S RESPONSIBILITY.

By David M. Adeney. (*Inter-Varsity Fellowship*.) 92 pp. 4s.

This is a book first published in 1955 by the Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship of the U.S.A. A member of the China Inland Mission for many years, Mr. Adeney was set apart for student work in Chinese universities during the period of amazing opportunity (1945-49) which preceded the Communist invasion. He stayed long enough to appraise the impact of Communism upon the Christian Church in China, and especially upon Christian students. After working with the I.V.C.F. in North America for some years, he is now an apostle to university students through south-east Asia, from Korea and Japan to Thailand and Singapore. He writes with wide knowledge of the missionary opportunity, as well as of the obstacles to the advance of the Gospel. It is his firm conviction that, whether as "professional" missionaries or as vocational witnesses (that is, men and women taking salaried positions in non-Christian countries with a definitely missionary aim), God is calling university students in Britain and America to face the challenge of the unfinished task in the light of our Saviour's near return. For such students this is a dangerous book, for, as the final paragraph puts it: "Whether or not you will fulfil God's purpose for your life and have a vital share in the building of the Church of the Lord Jesus may depend upon the decision that you make as a result of reading this book". But all who are concerned for world evangelization should read *The Unchanging Commission*. With deadly accuracy Mr. Adeney describes the challenge of Communism: "If Communism is to be withstood, it must be understood" (p. 20); "Communism may well be the climax of man's rebellion against God" (p. 21). It "does not demand personal holiness", yet it "provides a substitute for almost every Christian doctrine and experience". Truly "the

devil is a past master at producing religious counterfeits ". In such a situation the missionary of today must be disciplined, mature, stable, adaptable, humble, and courteous, with a thorough knowledge of the Word of God. It was very far from Mr. Adeney's thoughts to paint a self-portrait, but, thank God, that is the very sort of man that he is, and one prays that many who read the book may share his burning desire for the glory of God, and his love for the souls of men.

FRANK HOUGHTON, *Bishop*.

CHRISTIAN ENCOUNTER.

By A. J. Boyd. (*Saint Andrew Press.*) 122 pp. 16s.

Dr. Boyd, Principal-Emeritus of Madras Christian College, was invited by the Trustees of the Warrack Lectureship to set forth some of "the factors in the world situation in which the command to preach the Gospel to every creature has to be fulfilled in our time", with special attention to "the encounter with non-Christian faith". The lectures were delivered in New College, Edinburgh, and St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, and have now been published. In order to avoid too broad generalizations Dr. Boyd has focused our attention on India, where he has lived and worked for over thirty years. Of the five lectures, however, the first and the last do deal rather largely with generalizations—the first concerning the "reconception of Mission" during the fifty years following the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, and the last entitled "Signs of our Times" which are listed as (1) the Rediscovery of the Laity, as called of God to take a far larger share in the task of evangelization; (2) "Supplementary" Ministers of Word and Sacraments—that is, men other than full-time salaried ministers who may nevertheless be ordained to administer the Sacraments as well as to preach the Word; and (3) Movements towards Reunion, with special reference to what has been accomplished in South India, and what is planned for India/Pakistan and for Ceylon.

The three central chapters, however, contain specific and perhaps less widely known information concerning the formidable task of the church in India, as it faces a renascent Hinduism and many other problems. While accepting, almost without question, Dr. Boyd's cogent review of earlier misconceptions of the role of the missionary—including, for example, the necessity that "the indigenous church should not live under the shadow of the foreign Mission, but must itself be the organ of mission" (p. 16)—your reviewer is concerned by the writer's apparent uncertainty about the attitude which both the missionary and the indigenous church should adopt towards Hinduism. As a Christian Dr. Boyd is, of course, convinced that there is something unique about the authority of Christ, and therefore he cannot be satisfied with the admission of many liberal-minded Hindus that Christ is "one of the greatest of all teachers", and their affirmation that all religions are, in essence, one—though indeed to their minds "Hinduism is *superior* to other religions" because of "its all-embracing tolerance". But neither does he whole-heartedly align himself with Dr. Kraemer's thesis that "the Christian Revelation is absolutely *sui generis*". Thus he poses, but does not answer, the

question by *what authority* we say to Hindus, Buddhists, or Muslims "that Christ alone is God's sure Word to man" (pp. 80, 81). To the great Baptist pioneers, Carey, Marshman, and Ward (as Dr. Boyd points out) Hinduism as a system of religion was essentially an evil thing, "to be undermined and ultimately overthrown" (p. 72). While stressing as they did that "the real conquests of the Gospel are those of love", and not of violent denunciation of idolatry, it still remains true that the Church of India is unlikely to make serious headway unless it perceives that the power behind the idols is of Satan and not of God.

FRANK HOUGHTON, Bishop.

THE SCROLLS AND CHRISTIAN ORIGINS : STUDIES IN THE JEWISH BACKGROUND OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

By *Matthew Black*. (Nelson.) 206 pp. 25s.

This book is beautifully produced and has twelve pages of splendid illustrations. It gives a careful assessment by a leading Semitic scholar in these isles of the significance for the origins of the Christian Church of the now famous Dead Sea scrolls. Dr. Black of the University of St. Andrews regards the connection between the Qumran Community and Essenism as now sufficiently well established. The differences which occur between the accounts of Essenism in Philo and Josephus and that which the scrolls have now brought to light are to be accounted for on the ground that the latter give us first-hand information and in several respects serve as a corrective to what we read elsewhere. Essenism appears to be descended from the Hasideanism of the Maccabean period and to be a continuation of a pre-Ezra type of Hebrew religion going back to old ascetical movements such as Rechabitism. As such it existed in various forms alongside the more "official" movements of Pharisaism and Sadduceeism, and in its greater spirituality and respect for the teaching of the prophets as well as of the Law exhibits much closer affinities with the Christian movement described in the pages of the New Testament. Dr. Black finds special points of contact in the reference to "Hebrews" in Acts vi. 1 and to *parthenoi* in I Corinthians vii. 25, as well as in the community of goods and the vivid eschatological expectation shared by both groups. But whereas the Covenanters of Qumran, like the psalmists and prophets of old, appear to have understood something of the secret of evangelical religion and of the need of total commitment to God for justification and sanctification, they were still muscle-bound by Jewish racialism and legalism. So even if our Lord found in contemporary Essenism as represented by Qumran much that was congenial and by way of a *praepraeparatio evangelica*, He actually went far beyond it, and by His own life and ministry unto death "transformed the practices of a sect into a universal religion". After detailed consideration of the teaching and practice of the Scroll People in respect of baptisms, sacred meals, priestly organization, interpretation of Scripture, expectation of the Messiah, and the like, there is a useful closing chapter in which the author's main conclusions are summarized and set out in numbered sequence. Appendices give the accounts of the Essenes found in Philo

and Josephus and notes on Aramaic texts from Qumran and on the relationship between the Qumran Calendar and the Last Supper.

L. E. H. STEPHENS-HODGE.

A NEW APPROACH TO COLOSSIANS.

By L. J. Baggott. (Mowbray.) 143 pp. 21s.

The word "new" has almost lost its meaning. It has been murdered by the advertising men. Yet here we have a book which lives up to its claim to be new. It is fresh, vigorous, and stimulating. It is at once deeply theological and intensely practical, relevant and urgent. It seeks to show in a striking way that "St. Paul's Epistle to the Colossians may quite properly be called the Gospel of the Cosmic Christ".

After a full introduction to the background of the epistle, the Archdeacon of Norfolk gives us an introduction, translation, and exposition of each chapter. He is not concerned with all the minutiae of exegesis, but carries us along powerfully on the crest of his thesis. In Colossians he believes that we encounter "the ripest teaching of the great master". Christ is shown as not only the Head of the Church but also of the whole human race. Only in Him can there be solutions found for all the problems from Teddy-boys to nuclear tests. Only in the acknowledgment of Him as Lord can there be any hope for the world. "Religion is never quite so profound as when it is profoundly practical," and many illustrations are given of how it can be just that. "Well," he concludes, "may we pray for the reign of the Cosmic Christ, and look for the day when the vast invisible spiritual world will break in upon the visible and material order to transform and glorify it, and Christ be All in all."

If one must criticize, it seems that we are almost being led to a universalism which is foreign to New Testament thought as a whole. But all honour to the Archdeacon for sounding the notes he does sound so clearly.

R. E. NIXON.

AN EXPOSITION OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

By John Brown. (Banner of Truth Trust.) 728 pp. 18s.

This is the latest volume of the Geneva Series of Commentaries (so the cover tells us, as there seems to be no reference to the fact on the title page). It is by John Brown III (as the Americans would say) who was the son and grandson of famous Scottish preachers and scholars. He was himself Professor of Exegetical Theology for the Secession Church as well as minister at Broughton Place Church, Edinburgh. The volume was published first in 1862, three years after the author's death, and has been reprinted at a bargain price by offset lithography.

The volume is entitled "an Exposition" and it is more than a commentary of the kind that is normally produced today. The introduction is extremely thin and the most interesting thing about it is the list of interpreters of the Epistle (p. 11), as many of the names will be unfamiliar to modern readers. When he reaches the text, it is a different story. Here we see scholarly and thorough exegesis which

seeks to face up to the problems which the study of the epistle posed in his day. Much more scholarly ink has flowed since then and in many cases the modern reader may wish to disagree with Brown's interpretations, but they are usually well argued and never, as he describes some fanciful comments, "drivelling nonsense" (p. 535). An exposition of this size and containing many long sentences is not easy reading, but for those who are prepared to go deep, it may well serve "to bring the minds of his hearers or readers into *immediate contact* with the mind of the Spirit" (p. 8).

R. E. NIXON.

WHEN ISRAEL CAME OUT OF EGYPT.

By Gabriel Hebert. (S.C.M.) 128 pp. 8s. 6d.

The fact that our faith, like that of Israel, is based on certain historical events, means that we must be prepared to subject the biblical account of those events to historical scrutiny. The alternative, to keep one's devotional and critical studies of the Bible in watertight compartments, is both intellectually dishonest and spiritually dangerous. For ordinary readers, untrained in the ways of historical and theological research, all this is apt to be very bewildering. It is to help such people that this little book has been written. Fixing attention on the Exodus of Israel from Egypt as the historical prototype and prophecy of Christ's work of redemption on the Cross, Father Hebert shows what a basic position the Exodus held in Israel's faith throughout the Old Testament period and he then goes on to discuss its place in world-history, including questions of date, numbers, supernatural happenings, and whether all the Israelite tribes were actually involved in the Exodus experience. His general conclusion is that while the over-all outline of the events described in the Pentateuch is historically verifiable, we are not under obligation to press every detail. Due allowance must be made for particular viewpoints and for poetic and literary devices. The main events are unassailable; indeed the subsequent history of Israel is inexplicable apart from them. It is thus possible to believe that the 480 years mentioned in I Kings vi. 1 as the length of time which elapsed between the Exodus and the building of Solomon's Temple and the enormous figure of 600,000 able-bodied men coming out of Egypt (Exodus xii. 37) are both mistaken, without thereby losing one's faith in the witness of the Scriptures as a whole to God's saving activity. This kind of approach will not suit the brittle type of fundamentalist, but should prove helpful to those whose minds are not already made up in advance and who value scholarly confirmation of the essential truth of God's written Word.

L. E. H. STEPHENS-HODGE.

PROVERBS AND ECCLESIASTES.

By Edgar Jones. (S.C.M.) 349 pp. 18s.

OBADIAH, NAHUM, HABAKKUK, ZEPHANIAH.

By J. H. Eaton. (S.C.M.) 159 pp. 12s. 6d.

These are good additions to the Torch series: concise, non-technical, well-informed, and constructive. The standpoint is that of critical

scholarship in its present mood of reverence for the Word of God which it is eager to discover in these writings, and of readiness to see the wholeness of a book where an earlier school of criticism would have delved only for fragments. The exception to this is the commentary on Ecclesiastes, in which the commentator finds himself unable to reconcile its paradoxes, and therefore aligns himself with those who detect three or four sources of what is sometimes "mutually exclusive" material.

Both commentators are well versed in the contemporary discussion of their respective subjects. Mr. Jones draws very freely on extra-biblical wisdom literature, from *Ptah-Hotep* down to *Pirke Aboth*, and Mr. Eaton views his prophets always against the background of the Jerusalem cultus. But both alike resist the temptation to be content with placing their material in its *Sitz im Leben*: they are primarily concerned to show what God has to say to us today, and they fulfil this task thoughtfully and persuasively. In Proverbs there is an occasional lapse (e.g., the solemn explanation of the phrase "afraid of snow" (xxxix. 21), which runs: "used here as synonymous with cold weather"), but on the whole the writing is economical and pointed; and Mr. Eaton's commentary on the prophets contains much that is vividly expressed.

F. D. KIDNER.

FRONTIERS OF THE CHURCH: THE MAKING OF THE ANGLICAN COMMUNION.

By H. G. G. Herklots. (Benn.) 293 pp. 35s.

"There is not any man of the Church of England, but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth; nor any man a member of the commonwealth which is not also of the Church of England." This quotation from Richard Hooker forms the starting point from which the author traces the development of Anglican expansion from the sixteenth century to the present time, and in the course of his story, he continually comes across the tension which arose when Hooker's dictum crossed the path of Edward Haie's further claim, made about the same time, of great land masses, as yet unexplored, that "God hath reserved . . . to be reduced unto Christian civility by the English nation".

This book is not a history of Anglican expansion, but rather a story of the many individuals who made their contribution to its haphazard growth. The well known figures are given adequate treatment, but a number of lesser known personalities appear, whose work and witness both lighten the narrative and enlighten the reader, while small incidents, such as the reason why Hingham church in Norfolk still has no chancel step, open up vivid pictures of controversies of past days. The author sketches the process by which episcopacy was transplanted overseas, especially to America, and the part played in this by the Episcopal Church of Scotland, while he does not neglect to show how the various Prayer Books in use owe their origin either to the 1549 or to the 1552 Books of Common Prayer. The parts played by the great trading companies are outlined, and a corrective supplied to those who argue that English commercial influence has been wholly opposed to

religious interests. In the transplantation of Anglicanism, the power of nostalgia has played no small part; this is discernible both in architecture and organization. But as Canon Herklots well reminds us, the time came for the handing over to those who had few memories but many hopes, and that process has been complicated by the continuing visible reminders of colonial status.

But part of the fascination of this process has been the discovery of the truth that benefits conferred so often bring unexpected returns to the benefactors. It frequently happened that an overseas situation encouraged a boldness of experiment and largeness of vision which in turn brought new vigour and ideas to the mother country, as for example the holding of diocesan synods at Lichfield by Bishop Selwyn, who had previously introduced them into New Zealand. So the story moves from India to Africa, to Canada, and to Japan. It has sometimes been unkindly suggested that the traffic sign at the entrance to Dean's Yard, Westminster, *Dead Slow, Sound Horn*, is the motto of the Church of England. If there has been much sounding of horns, let those who read this volume recall with thankfulness that there has also been considerable movement of traffic. G. C. B. DAVIES.

THE CALLING OF GOD.

By J. G. Riddell. (*Saint Andrew Press*.) 134 pp. 21s.

Professor Riddell delivered these Croall Lectures in 1955, but did not live to prepare them for publication. This task was performed by John Macquarrie, who tells us that certain additional material collected by Professor Riddell has been incorporated into the manuscript, though a final chapter on the Last Things, contemplated by Professor Riddell, was never written. What we have is a study of some principal points in the faith and order of the Church, more particularly in relation to the Church's task of evangelism. While Professor Riddell writes as a theologian it is one of the great merits of his book that he never loses sight of the practical needs of the evangelist and the pastor. He writes with wide learning and usually with sympathy for those points of view from which he differs. An exception has to be made here for the conservatism which forms the background to a good deal of his book. For example, he says that the leaders of the Reformation "could not recognize the comparable dangers of belief in an infallible book because they were not in fact claiming for it the kind of independent authority which the modern fundamentalist asserts. The authority of Scripture was linked with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit 'bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts'" (p. 112). One would never guess from this that "the modern fundamentalist" often puts great stress on the witness of the Holy Spirit. Similarly many conservatives would not accept the writer's strictures on election. Nevertheless the discussion is informed and wide-ranging. And even those who differ most from the author will be all the better for having faced the issues he raises. LEON MORRIS.

ADOMNAN'S LIFE OF COLUMBA.

Edited with Translation and Notes by A. O. and M. O. Anderson.
(Nelson.) 590 pp. 50s.

This substantial volume has been prepared with scrupulous scholarship by the late Dr. Anderson, with the collaboration and final revision of his wife. Recent excavations at Iona were completed too late for their results to be properly assessed by the editors, but apart from this, the book represents the latest fruits of Columban study. The Latin Text, printed in its original orthography, is that of the Schaffhausen manuscript, of which four pages are given in facsimile, and the transcription is much more accurate than that of Reeves; variant readings, together with a short appendix on Columba's monks and relatives, are taken from the three other manuscripts of the complete Life. Since the editors have rightly decided that "Cummian" was not used by Adomnan as a source, their pages are not encumbered by the heavy black type which disfigures Fowler's edition. But as they combine footnotes with textual variants in a single *apparatus*, the annotation is sometimes difficult to follow. The English translation is masterly: apt and accurate, but eminently readable in its own right. A lengthy Introduction is concerned almost entirely with questions of phonetics and philology, and, although the material will be of great interest to specialists, this type of approach has little value for the general reader. The identification of biblical and patristic references is scarcely adequate. There is a General Index, an Index of Subjects, and an Index of Latin Words; these would have been easier to use if reference had been made to page and line of the printed text, instead of to the manuscript columns listed in the margin. Walafrid Strabo is correctly named on p. 154, but in the Index and on p. 89 he has become "Strabus". Adomnan is the correct form of the name with which we are familiar as "Adamnan"; but the editors have not been pedantic enough to make a corresponding change in the current mis-spelling of Iona.

G. S. M. WALKER.

THE CHARITIES OF RURAL ENGLAND, 1480-1660: THE ASPIRATIONS AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF RURAL SOCIETY.

By W. K. Jordon. (Allen & Unwin.) 484 pp. 50s.

Our society must decide what to do with those who cannot support themselves. Old people in particular are lonely and often see no purpose in their lives. They are discarded. They live away from the strong in "Homes" for the aged, or bungalow estates. All we do is keep them alive. A new approach to charity could make those now hopeless live purposeful, valuable lives.

A great deal of thinking seems to be necessary before we can deal with the present situation. Radical change needs to be prepared for by studying the way the Church has responded to similar situations in the past. Professor Jordon's painstaking and original research has produced material for such study. This book completes a series of three which are together a masterly survey of the attempts of men to build a society in which the evils of poverty are removed. It is

useful because of its detail. It shows the fluctuations which occurred with changing social patterns, and which varied in intensity from parish to parish. At first giving was by haphazard dole. Later institutions were established to enable the poor to better their own lot. Local variations depended on the initiative of individuals who aspired to do works of mercy and who inspired others to imitate them.

Jordon's attention to detail and his massing statistics add authority to the general impressions which have been known to historians for some time. In 1480 men's interests were primarily "religious". The Reformation heralded a heightening of interest in poverty. By Archbishop Laud's day the consuming interest of men was the secular, and his attempts at church reform failed to stop the fall in giving to religious charity. By 1660 schemes for municipal improvements, education, and social rehabilitation accounted for most of the money given.

In our own day needs are changing as quickly as ever, yet the response of men to those needs is sluggish. There should be a fresh approach based on biblical teaching and what can be learnt from the past. We can thank Professor Jordon for his scholarly contribution to this.

JOHN MCKECHNIE.

THE HUMANIST FRAME.

Edited by Julian Huxley. (Allen & Unwin.) 432 pp. 37s. 6d.

The object of this book is to commend humanism (spelt throughout with a capital H). Most of the writers of the twenty-six essays of which the book consists use the word as meaning broadly the view that man, by the use of his powers which have evolved down the ages, can, if he behaves rationally, guide himself to a glorious future of developed potentialities. In skilful hands this can be an intoxicating philosophy. But here there is no draught of vintage until the last essay is reached. In the remaining twenty-five, wide in range though they are—from scientists, doctors, philosophers, journalists, sociologists, architects, musicians, lawyers and economists, to mention only a few of the fields of learning represented—the reader must content himself with a sip here and there of the blushful Hippocrene.

The band is led by the editor, Sir Julian Huxley. This is Huxley at his most impatient and irritable. His dogmatism brooks no opposition. The picture he presents is perhaps just believable for a small intellectual minority, but it seems far removed from the immediate needs and problems of the struggling human race. Unfortunately he sets the tone for some of the mumbo-jumbo that follows. Huxley and his like can hardly complain of theological jargon. Couched in his rather wooden style the jargon of evolutionary humanism seems decidedly anæmic. The pale Galilean is rich-blooded by comparison.

One of the better essays in the book is Dr. Bronowski's "Science is Human". As always, Bronowski is lucid and attractive. He sketches the history of science with particular emphasis upon the Renaissance and the eighteenth century and strikes some telling blows at the Church. But he identifies the Church with authoritarianism and, like several other modern humanists, seems not to appreciate that non-conformity,

in the sense of rebellion against an established order, may go with belief in God as well as with scientific humanism. Submission to the establishment is not the same as submission to the Word of God. So when Bronowski uses as one of his arguments against Christianity that "change . . . is unthinkable in a world which God had already ordered to His design", he is attacking a static religious conservatism, not the dynamic God of history revealed in the Bible.

And so to the intoxication of the concluding essay, the third in the book from the pen of a Huxley. Among all brother Aldous's brilliant pieces this is outstanding. Ideas which have been foreshadowed in detail in earlier books are here brought together in a compelling ten-page thesis. Freud is dismissed with extraordinary penetration in a single paragraph. Aldous Huxley's well-known views on education—his concern for the proper use of language, combined with the importance of training children in perceptual (as well as conceptual) awareness—are so convincingly presented that one is almost prepared to accept his "sober optimism" in man's great potentialities and their imminent realization. But unlike most of his fellow-writers Huxley dares to face up to the question. "How do we make people good?" After reviewing the traditional answers, the only positive advice he can offer is to follow the example of some savages in New Guinea who repeat the word "good" to babies as they bring them lovingly into contact with other members of the family. The only reference he makes to sin is in his remark that "a few doses of one of the psychic energizers can totally abolish a deeply rooted conviction of sin". And, apart from this flippancy in the face of the major obstacle to man's goodness, there lurks behind all the glow of Huxley's writing this unanswered question: even for the favoured human being who can actualize his potentialities, what is the ultimate value if death is the end of all things?

Nevertheless, Aldous Huxley's essay is a classic expression of the best of contemporary humanism, and even if the Christian reader has no time for the rest of the book he should find that this essay is worth more than one reading.

DEREK TAYLOR THOMPSON.

THE PRICE OF MORALITY.

By Pepita Haezrahi. (Allen & Unwin.) 286 pp. 35s.

This book is difficult to read. To add to the intrinsic difficulty of the subject matter, there are misprints on nearly every page, the English is far from adequate, and the type is too small for comfort. It would be a pity if these shortcomings deterred the reader from finishing the book, because the closing chapters are important.

Dr. Haezrahi begins with a detailed analysis of some of the leading English moral philosophers of this century, in particular, Moore, Ross, Carrigg, and Alexander. Kant is then introduced on to the stage, and although he is freely criticized it is evident that he commands more respect than the others. From these rather technical foundations the last fifty pages build up an edifice of more general interest. Three attitudes are compared: the religious (whereby everything is made subservient to the will of God), the moral (which regards moral values as autonomous and centred upon the dignity of man) and the maxi-

malist (*i.e.*, Nietzschean "superman" ethics). As Dr. Haezrahi conceives them, these attitudes are mutually incompatible. Each man must examine them and make his choice. After carefully weighing the pros and cons, Dr. Haezrahi, following Kant, chooses the second of the three. In doing so she recognizes the price that has to be paid for it, in cutting loose from anchorage in God and putting one's neighbour's needs before one's own. This is "the price of morality".

The book is notable for the honesty of its argument. Even though one may choose differently from the author, one is grateful for the clarity with which the choice is posed, and the recognition that there is no logical proof of the superiority of one attitude over another.

DEREK TAYLOR THOMPSON.

OUR CHURCHES AND WHY WE BELIEVE IN THEM.

By Various Authors. (Seeley, Service.) 251 pp. 10s. 6d.

This is a readable straightforward introduction in which each author seeks to give a clear account of the life and teaching of the Church to which he belongs, and to see it in its relationship to the Universal Church in the world of today. From the Anglican point of view the first two Essays are very significant.

The Primate of Australia shows a broad grasp of the present situation. He deals clearly with the doctrinal causes of the break with Rome. He speaks with concern of certain false emphases of the Oxford Movement which would turn the Holy Communion into a propitiatory sacrifice. He notes the marked change in the religious scene and the desire of Evangelical and Anglo-Catholic to draw near to each other in our only Lord and Saviour. He practises intercommunion, and evidently sees the Church of Scotland as part of the One Holy Catholic Church. He rejoices in the Gospel as the answer to man's needs and problems.

Canon Rathbone emphasizes the sacramental nature of the Church, states that every baptism is a birth of the Spirit, declares that Scripture *and* tradition are essential, and finds in the united Episcopate the organ of the Church's authority (unjustifiably identifying the function of Bishop and Apostle). He questions Cranmer's beliefs as revealed in the Book of Common Prayer, and recommends the cultus of the Reserved Sacrament. The essay is disappointing; it is marked by ecclesiastical and intellectual subtlety; it seems that he is seeking to justify a position which cannot be justified from the Book of Common Prayer.

Dr. Burleigh writes as a loyal son of the Church of Scotland about its order and discipline, its obedience to the Word of God, its refusal to become a clerical society, its freedom as a National Church, and its devotion to the Gospel.

Dr. Champion gives an attractive account of the Baptist churches as essentially free independent churches under the Word of God; of the need of personal response to the Grace of God; and of Believer's Baptism as the seal of that response.

Congregationalism, says Dr. Routley, emphasizes the Covenant Relationship of God and His people, and accepts the baptism of infants. Congregationalists have similar views to Baptists on the independence of the local church. On page 162 Dr. Routley misses out the reference to the 1552 Book of Common Prayer.

Mr. Davies gives an able account of the Methodist Church, its orthodoxy, the doctrines it specially emphasizes, its evangelistic zeal and careful organization, and the weaknesses that appear in actual practice.

Mr. Gorman describes the Society of Friends with their emphasis on the importance of an inward spiritual experience, their non-sacramental worship because the whole of life is sacramental, their work for peace, and their concern for education. There is singularly little emphasis on the atoning work of Christ; a positive preaching of the Gospel is not a mark of the Quakers; they aim to further the work of Christ by their lives.

It is a pity that the book is marred by a considerable number of misprints. Laymen will find it an interesting and instructive book showing how devoted sons regard their Churches. T. ANSCOMBE.

MOUNT ATHOS: THE CALL FROM SLEEP.

By Erhart Kaestner. (Faber & Faber.) 192 pp. 30s.

This book is written by a German Lutheran and purports to discover in the Holy Mountain of the Greek Orthodox Church, Mount Athos, a touchstone by which to judge Western civilization since the Renaissance. It takes the form of a travelogue, written in a slightly turgid style which probably lost some imaginative element in the translation.

The author is captivated by the mystery, the "sacramental" ethos of the Orthodox Church. He meets the hermits, the ascetics, the images; he loses his heart to the liturgy and the incessant Little Prayer of Jesus, repeated over and over again for hours on end. He draws the conclusion that we must all be Christian *and* Greek—that Æschylus, Sophocles, and Plato were "gathered into the light of the Incarnation".

His style can be captured in a brief but typical sentence: "One could well invent another name for it, but the state must be given some name or other; so why neglect the old images". The degree of addiction to things "Orthodox" can be summarized in a suggestion—endorsed by the author—that iconoclasm is the equivalent of damnation, for the saints are in a sense "themselves present in their images". His distaste for things "Reformed" is equally explicitly expressed in a comparison of the "small Greek churches" with the "arid praying chambers of the Reformation".

But perhaps the most striking statement in the whole book is on page 35. "Athos has the will to be a place where the Gospel teaching of perfect freedom prevails." Who would think, reading those words, that Athos stands in a land where it is forbidden by the law for a Protestant to publish the Scriptures in the vernacular without the

permission of the Orthodox authorities, and where the Protestant minority is as systematically harassed as Christians behind the Iron Curtain?

DAVID WINTER.

1662 AND ALL THAT.

By Dewi Morgan. (Mowbray.) 131 pp. 6s.

Here is one of the first books to commemorate the tercentenary of the 1662 Prayer Book. Its author tries hard to be popular, and the work rumbles along in a jocular way, pausing now and then to be more serious, seeing events through certain spectacles, and sitting lightly to history on occasion. A Reformer and a Caroline are treated condescendingly (p. 3), and, of course, omniscient modern liturgical scholarship is duly eulogized. P. 10 shows us the real presence, and apparently everything from overseas oil workers to trade unionists and bosses are present in the eucharistic offering. The list is truly astonishing, but perhaps we should be grateful that somehow these last two *can* be brought together, though any relation to a New Testament sacrament is purely fortuitous. Mr. Morgan is keener on 1549 than 1552; Puritans are caricatured as gloom-mongers and pleasure-haters (p. 63); everyone who dares to challenge the official middle-of-the-road line is in danger of being damned as an extremist. We learn that the Anglican ethos is found in the Bible and "the cumulative experience of the Church" (p. 117), but what this last thing is and where it is to be found is anyone's guess. Plenty about Rome, something about the Orthodox Church, but little about the godly men ejected in 1662 by tyrannical bishops, a ruthless Parliament, and a double-crossing king. There are brighter patches in the book. Mr. Morgan knows eucharistic problems are not as easy as the Lambeth bishops seemed to think, but this book is scarcely worthy to commemorate 1662. It can only be described as one of the poorer manifestations of "middle-of-the-road-manship", yet the middle is not where Cranmer had it, but rather somewhere between Caroline High Churchmanship and Tractarianism, and nearer the latter.

G. E. DUFFIELD.

A CHRISTIAN THERAPY FOR A NEUROTIC WORLD.

By E. N. Ducker. (Allen & Unwin.) 225 pp. 21s.

During the next few years we are likely to see several good books on Pastoral Psychology published in this country. This book by Canon Ducker, of St. Margaret's, Leicester, will hold its own as a good treatment of a difficult subject. Not only does Dr. Frank Lake give it his *imprimatur*, but Canon Ducker has an experience of books and people that has taken him further than most of us are likely to go. The author is not tied to any single school, but is prepared to interpret individual needs in the way that works best. He explains his aims and techniques against the background of what he calls the inner-body, the outer-body, and the spiritual-body, which must be kept in harmony if a person is to be whole. The inner-body is the physical-thinking-feeling part of the personality; the outer-body is his environment; the spiritual-body is "the spiritual dimension of man where the Spirit

moves creatively upon the waters of the Soul" (p. 79). Various detailed case histories illustrate how these bodies are damaged.

Canon Ducker has an interesting method of dream interpretation, in which he gets the patient to feel the key points of his dream over again, and to distil a concentrated emotion from them. There is no playing down of Christian doctrine or belittling of a proper sense of guilt, as in some psychological approaches.

J. STAFFORD WRIGHT.

THE DIVINE AWAKENING.

By Brother Mandus. (Arthur James.) 191 pp. 15s.

Those who are already familiar with the books on healing and dynamic life that have been published by Arthur James will find more in this book than will the reader who comes fresh to the subject. The book is enthusiastic, but muddled in what the author has to say. Thus one can pick up some helpful crumbs, but never finds a slice of bread. The theme is that all over the world—and Brother Mandus has travelled widely—there is an awakening of the realization of what the Christ within can mean to mankind. This is seen in divine healing, a greater seriousness in prayer and meditation, and in an understanding that Christian love is the key to the needs of mankind. The author illustrates this from his own experiences, and seeks to lead others to launch out into the deeper things of God.

Brother Mandus is not a theologian. Thus, while he has brought out some important aspects of biblical truth, and given texts to support them, he leaves the Evangelical with some serious queries in his mind.

J. STAFFORD WRIGHT.

ZOAR: OR THE EVIDENCE OF PSYCHICAL RESEARCH CONCERNING SURVIVAL.

By W. H. Salter. (Sidgwick & Jackson.) 238 pp. 21s.

The unusual title conceals an excellent book on physical research and survival. Mr. Salter avoids the all-or-nothing approach, and concludes that the evidence leads no further than a little city (Gen. xix. 20-22) beyond which lies the promised land of which religious people speak. Mr. Salter shows keener perception than Dr. Crookall, whose recent book *The Supreme Adventure* was published under the auspices of the Churches' Fellowship for Psychical Study. He has seen that, if some communications have truly come from the departed, they have not proved the Christian hope, but have merely demonstrated limited survival for a certain period.

Mr. Salter's book has the cautious approach of a former secretary and president of the Society for Psychical Research. He is critical of many claims for hauntings, poltergeists, materializations, and spirit-photography. But he is convinced by what has become known as cross-correspondences, whereby it appears that a group of communicators have adopted a sort of crossword clue technique in messages through a group of automatists, each receiving partial clues to the final answer. Mr. Salter finds analogies with the working of the conscious

and unconscious mind, and relates the experience of the automatist to the experience of inspiration that has come to some poets and writers. I personally have regarded cross-correspondences as impressive evidence, though it can perhaps be turned by postulating either the intervention of some deceptive spirit or a greater extent of interworking of minds on earth than is commonly supposed.

J. STAFFORD WRIGHT.

CHURCH DOGMATICS: VOLUME III: THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.

By Karl Barth. Part 2, 661 pp.; Part 3, 544 pp.; Part 4, 704 pp. (T. & T. Clark.) 55s. each part-volume.

The exacting task of preparing an English translation of Karl Barth's *maximum opus* continues with commendable efficiency, and translators and editors are deserving of every recognition for the service they are performing. Volume III of the *Church Dogmatics* is devoted to a comprehensive study (well over 2,000 pages!) of the Doctrine of Creation, the first part of which considered "The Work of Creation" in accordance with Barth's characteristic christological method of interpretation. How deeply his anthropology is grounded in christology is further demonstrated in the second, third, and fourth parts now before us, which concern themselves with "The Creature", "The Creator and His Creature", and "The Command of God the Creator" respectively. The theological concept of man may be discovered, he maintains, only by contrasting man with the man Jesus, who is "the creature who exists for God". Jesus is "the Real Man", who is placed in the midst of all other men as man's divine counterpart. The humanity of Jesus is essentially cohumanity, which is also definitive of all humanity, for it is existence in encounter. One must ask, however, whether this concept of the humanization of God in Jesus, and of man as Christ's fellow-creature, does not hopelessly blur the absolute distinction between the Creator and the creature.

Obviously it is impossible in a brief review to do anything like justice to the contents of these three part-volumes. Their riches will be yielded up only to the persevering reader. In them will be found the theme of the indissoluble unity of human nature as soul and body; the presentation of time as God's time and man's time; the providence of God considered in three aspects as preserving, accompanying, and ruling; an assessment of the significance of the history of the Jews; the highly contestable concept of "Nothingness" as a reality which, however, does not exist in the same sense that God exists and the creature exists, but is that which God does not will, the possibility which He has passed over; and an exposition of the ethical and social implications of God's commands for man as His creature.

The theology of Barth is remarkable and stimulating not only because of its scope but also because of its penetration of thought. His is indeed a "creative" intellect; but it is precisely his ingenuity—always massive and never superficial though it is—which leads him into modes of thought that are properly other than biblical, marked by dialectical ambiguity, and centred in a philosophy of christology rather than in the trinitarian revelation.

PHILIP E. HUGHES.

THE LETTERS AND DIARIES OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN :
VOLUME XI, LITTLEMORE TO ROME : OCTOBER, 1845, to DECEMBER, 1846.

Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain. (Nelson.) 363 pp. 63s.

Though in the overall scheme, whereby Messrs. Nelson and Sons propose to publish Newman's correspondence in its entirety, this volume is number XI, it is the first of the series to appear. The edition, when completed, will reproduce all Newman's letters which are still extant—some 20,000 in all—together with the entries in his diaries (which extend over the years 1824 to 1879). The latter are the merest notes of persons and events, and form only a very minor part of the material. The task of collecting the letters was, in fact, begun by Newman himself, and the years of his Anglican period were widely, though not exhaustively, covered by the two volumes of *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman* (1891) edited by Anne Mozley (sister-in-law of Jemima, Newman's sister) and the one-volume *Correspondence of John Henry Newman with John Keble and others, 1839-1845* (1917) edited by Joseph Bacchus. For the Roman Catholic period the major source has been Wilfred Ward's two-volume *Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman* (1912) in which, however, the letters are incomplete and not always accurately transcribed. For many years now the Birmingham Oratory has been assiduously collecting either the autograph or a copy of every known letter of Newman, and with such success that the collection is now virtually complete.

The present volume commences at November 8th, 1845, the date on which Newman joined the Church of Rome, and it is proposed to complete the volumes covering Newman's Roman Catholic period—amounting to some twenty volumes in all—before producing the ten volumes which will cover the Anglican period. The editor has taken immense pains over the preparation of this work, annotating where necessary, providing a list of letters with their dates by Newman's correspondents, and adding an extremely serviceable index of persons and places which gives biographical and descriptive information concerning the names which occur in the text.

Newman is revealed as an inveterate correspondent, though not a great exponent of the art of letter-writing. The letters are not in general so revealing of the man, nor their prose so nervous and beguiling, as is the case with the *Apologia* (in which, of course, Newman only takes the reader up to 1845). But we live in the days of complete and definitive editions, from which nothing, however unimportant, is excluded; and there is no doubt that this work will be of the greatest value to those engaged on Newman studies. The publishers have done their part with impeccable distinction.

PHILIP E. HUGHES.

SHORTER NOTICES

2 PETER RECONSIDERED.

By E. M. B. Green. (Tyndale Press.) 37 pp. 1s. 6d.

A fresh examination of the question of the authenticity of the Second Epistle of Peter, convincingly argued, admirably presented, and impressive in scholarship. The arguments for and against the Petrine authorship are carefully investigated, and the conclusion is reached that "the letter is either a genuine one or an impudent forgery". The evidence, both internal and external, does not favour the latter conclusion. "It exhibits no proven anachronisms of language or doctrine; it has no heterodox axe to grind; it tells us nothing we did not already know about Peter . . . It bears no resemblance to any of the undoubted Petrine forgeries of the second century; it makes no mention of burning second-century problems like chiliasm, gnosticism, developed theosophical systems, or church leadership. As a pseudepigraph it has no satisfactory *raison d'être*. The case against the Epistle does not, in fact, appear by any means compelling. It cannot be shown conclusively that Peter was the author; but it has yet to be shown convincingly that he was not." This monograph merits the respectful attention of all who are concerned with New Testament studies. As a learned contribution it cannot be ignored, and it should do much to restore the confidence of those who have been disposed to doubt the genuineness of this Epistle.

THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF KIERKEGAARD FOR EVERYMAN.

By John A. Gates. (Hodder & Stoughton.) 155 pp. 5s.

An attempt to provide, within a short compass, a portrait of the melancholic Dane which is entirely successful. The writer is an enthusiast and accordingly not disposed to approach his subject critically. But the book is none the worse—indeed probably all the better in view of its scope—for that. It is skilfully written and makes absorbing reading. As an introduction to Kierkegaard, giving the biographical background so necessary for a proper understanding of his works, it could hardly be bettered. A paperback that would make a good Christmas present.

FERNAND PORTAL (1855-1926) : APOSTLE OF UNITY.

By H. Hemmer. Translated and edited by Arthur T. Macmillan. (Macmillan.) 182 pp. 25s.

Fernand Portal was a French Lazarist priest who developed a close friendship with the second Viscount Halifax, the forceful President of the Church Union, and devoted much of his time and energy to the attempt to bring about reunion between the Church of England and the Church of Rome. The culmination of his efforts was the Malines conversations of the 1920's. His and Halifax's hopes, however, were not to be realized. Yet, centred as they were in the advance of Anglo-Catholicism in England, these hopes were not without some grounds. "In England prejudices are disappearing," wrote Portal in 1894, "the Established Church asserts her independence of the civil authority, the

influence of the Oxford Movement continues to grow, and the Church is recovering the fulness of the faith. The inevitable, providential end of this evolution is Rome." On visiting England that same year he was "struck by the great resemblance between the ritualist and catholic ceremonial". With reference to the issue of the papal encyclical *Satis cognitum* a leading article in *The Times* of June 30th, 1896, declared that "the pretence can no longer be maintained that reconciliation with the Church of Rome does not involve renunciation of the Church of England". From the Roman side, a central point of controversy was the question of the validity of Anglican orders. Portal's attitude on this question was one of indecision. The debate was authoritatively resolved for the Romanists by the publication of the Bull *Apostolicæ Curæ* which affirmed that Anglican orders were absolutely null and void. But Portal, with the support of his Anglo-Roman friends in England, persevered with his endeavours to bring back the *Ecclesia Anglicana* into the papal fold. Of his own genuineness and of the attractiveness of his personality this book leaves no doubt. It may also be an eye-opener to some of the definite Romeward aspirations of a particular section of our Reformed Church of England.

THE CHURCH IN CRISIS : A HISTORY OF THE TWENTY GREAT COUNCILS.

By Philip Hughes. (Burns & Oates.) 342 pp. 35s.

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PHILIP E. HUGHES.

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